\\server05\productn\N\NYU\83-3\NYU302.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

21-MAY-08

8:57

RETHINKING “EFFECTIVE REMEDIES”:
REMEDIAL DETERRENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL COURTS
SONJA B. STARR*
One of the bedrock principles of contemporary international law is that victims of
human rights violations have a right to an “effective remedy.” International courts
usually hold that effective remedies must at least make the victim whole, and they
sometimes adopt even stronger remedial rules for particular categories of human
rights violations. Moreover, courts have refused to permit departure from these
rules on the basis of competing social interests. Human rights scholars have not
questioned this approach, frequently pushing for even stronger judicial remedies
for rights violations. Yet in many cases, strong and inflexible remedial rules can
perversely undermine human rights enforcement. Institutional constraints often
make it impractical or highly costly for international courts to issue remedies for
the violations they recognize. Inflexible remedial rules raise the collateral costs of
providing remedies and often drive courts to circumvent those costs by narrowing
their substantive interpretations of rights, raising the prejudice threshold required to
trigger a remedy or erecting procedural hurdles that allow them to avoid considering the claim at all. This Article illustrates these “remedial deterrence” effects
primarily with examples from the procedural rights case law of the International
Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and for the former Yugoslavia—two courts that
face particularly stark remedial costs. It then argues that similar dynamics are
likely at other international courts, though their degree, form, and consequences
will vary based on each court’s particular objectives and constraints.
Although some degree of remedial deterrence is inevitable and legitimate, extreme
remedial-cost pressures—like those often present in international criminal proceedings—result in severe doctrinal distortions that subvert the purpose of international
courts’ strong remedial rules. Because victims cannot be granted lesser remedies,
they often receive no remedy at all. This overkill effect is magnified because the
doctrinal distortions spill over to other cases lacking similar remedial costs and to
domestic courts and other actors that follow international judicial precedent, even
though they do not share the same institutional constraints. To mitigate these consequences, this Article makes two sets of recommendations. First, international
courts’ structures and procedures should be designed to avoid excessive remedial
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deterrence pressures. This Article offers specific proposals for international criminal tribunals. Second, international courts should modify their approach to the
effective remedy requirement, allowing some degree of equitable balancing of interests. Such an approach would promote judicial candor and enable courts to avoid
untenable remedial costs without unduly distorting other doctrines.
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INTRODUCTION
A bedrock principle of contemporary international human rights
law is that victims of violations have a right to an “effective remedy.”
Courts have largely treated this requirement as an absolute one and
have adopted a set of strong specific remedial rules to implement it in
particular situations. The most common formulation requires “full”
reparation for human rights violations—a remedy, usually damages,
that to the fullest extent possible makes the victim whole. Some international judicial remedies do not neatly track this “full remedy” ideal,
in the sense of precisely calibrated responses to quantifiable injuries,
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and may in fact go beyond it. Criminal procedure remedies in international criminal tribunals, for instance, tend to be blunt all-or-nothing
instruments. When remedies are granted, they often amount to windfalls that do more than make the defendant whole. But even in such
cases, international courts seek a fit between right and remedy. They
treat remedies as being determined exclusively by the nature of a violation and the resulting injury, refusing to curtail the remedy on the
basis of the competing social interests that are adversely affected by a
particular remedial order. They reject, in short, the notion of permissible gaps between rights and remedies.
Existing human rights scholarship on remedies has almost uniformly endorsed this approach. With narrowly confined exceptions,
scholars and international courts have yet to develop principles for
identifying second-best remedies where the most “effective” ones are
too costly or for determining whether remedial shortfall is permissible
in a given situation. To the extent the scholarship mentions the possibility of right-remedy gaps, it typically decries them and pushes for
stronger international judicial remedies for human rights violations.
The principle that “there is no right without a remedy” has a powerful
normative pull, especially given the gross disparities that have long
existed between the sonorous human rights ideals set forth in treaties
and the reality of weak enforcement. The scholarly emphasis on this
principle is thus understandable, but it can be counterproductive. As
this Article shows, strong remedial rules can undermine effective judicial enforcement of rights.
Institutional constraints and other competing interests sometimes
make it highly impractical or undesirable for international courts to
issue remedies for the rights violations they recognize. In these situations, strong remedial rules—by increasing the costs of remedies—
may perversely make it less likely that victims of human rights violations will receive any remedy at all. Courts circumvent these remedial
costs by adjusting doctrinal rules at various other stages of the proceedings so as to avoid recognizing a rights violation. They may
narrow their substantive interpretations of rights, erect procedural
hurdles to avoid hearing the claim, or adjust the burden of proof of
prejudice required to trigger a remedy.
Borrowing from the U.S. constitutional scholar Daryl Levinson, I
call these dynamics “remedial deterrence”: The costs of remedies
deter courts from vindicating rights.1 I illustrate them with examples
1 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 857, 884–85 (1999). Levinson focuses on the effects of remedial deterrence on the
interpretation of rights. Id. I apply his useful phrase slightly more broadly to encompass
similar effects on courts’ willingness to hear rights claims and on their prejudice doctrines.
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drawn principally from the case law of the International Criminal
Tribunals for Rwanda and for the former Yugoslavia (ICTR and
ICTY, respectively; collectively, ICTs). Specifically, I draw from the
ICTs’ criminal procedure jurisprudence dealing with the internationally protected human rights of defendants (not those of atrocity victims) and remedies for procedural violations of those rights.2 These
Tribunals are important interpreters of human rights law, especially
those aspects that relate to the criminal process. They aim to serve as
models of fair trials and rule of law for countries throughout the
world, particularly countries emerging from periods of violence. Their
responses to rights violations committed within their own pretrial and
trial proceedings are an important test of the viability of that model.
Moreover, their perceived fairness to defendants may be crucial to
their transitional justice objectives.
In the ICTs, the costs of ex post remedies for violations of defendants’ rights are often extremely stark. Like other international
courts, the ICTs have an effective-remedy requirement and reject the
notion of permissible remedial shortfall. On paper, they have the
same basic options available for implementing this requirement that
domestic criminal courts have. When a trial is unfair, they can order a
new one, and when a defendant’s rights have been badly violated in
other ways (e.g., various pretrial abuses), they can order release and
dismissal of charges. In practice, however, neither retrial nor release
is a tenable option. ICT trials typically last for years, cost millions of
dollars, and involve scores of witnesses—a process that the Tribunals
have neither the budget nor the will to repeat. Retrial is further precluded by the Tribunals’ temporary nature and looming closure. And
a Tribunal cannot simply release a convicted international criminal
because of a procedural error. Doing so would undermine its goal of
ending impunity for atrocities and moreover would be so politically
explosive as to endanger the Tribunal’s continued viability.
This Article shows that when faced with such intolerable remedial costs, the ICTs will adjust other doctrines to avoid granting remedies to the defendant. Sometimes, they do so by defining down the
right itself, particularly in cases involving pretrial procedure, such as
speedy trial cases. In other cases, the Tribunals use procedural mecha2 While international criminal prosecution might itself be thought of as a sort of
remedy for grave human rights abuses, this is not the sense in which I address the ICTs’
treatment of the right-remedy relationship. I focus solely on their procedural jurisprudence, and thus when I refer to putative “victims” of human rights violations in the context
of ICT procedure, I mean defendants who raise procedural rights claims. In their substantive jurisprudence, in contrast, the ICTs generally do not apply human rights law, but
rather the law of armed conflict and international criminal law—related but distinct fields.
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nisms—such as the appellate doctrine of waiver—to avoid hearing
defendants’ rights claims entirely. And a third strategy, which the
Tribunals have used in cases involving procedural violations pertaining to the trial, is to impose a particularly burdensome harmless
error standard: Defendants must prove by clear evidence that rights
violations were prejudicial.
To some extent, remedial deterrence is inevitable and legitimate.
At every stage of rights adjudication, international courts must
grapple with the real-world consequences of their decisions, including
remedial costs. But extreme remedial deterrence dynamics, like those
at the ICTs, raise serious normative concerns. They give rise to
overkill responses that subvert the purpose of the effective-remedy
requirement: Because full compliance with the requirement is too
costly, and lesser remedies are prohibited, victims often receive no
remedy at all.
Sometimes this outcome is reached through ad hoc doctrinal
manipulation on a case-by-case basis, rendering human rights enforcement arbitrary and confusing. Sometimes remedial deterrence results
in rules that are subsequently followed in other cases—but this consistency itself may magnify the overkill problem. Rather than simply
limiting the remedy in the particular case that poses high remedial
costs, international courts instead adjust other doctrines in ways that
spill over to cases in which such costs are absent. These spillover
effects may extend beyond the international court’s own docket, as
other actors, including domestic authorities and other international
courts, may follow the distorted doctrinal rules even if they do not
share the institutional constraints that produced the rules. These
dynamics also undermine judicial candor, because courts rarely admit
openly that they are narrowing a right in order to avoid a particular
remedial consequence.
Perhaps one could defend the choices that international courts
have made when confronting difficult dilemmas, but it would certainly
be better to reduce remedial costs so that courts would not face those
dilemmas in the first place. This Article accordingly makes two sets of
proposals for mitigating severe remedial costs in international courts.
The first set pertains to institutional design. International courts’
structures and procedures should be adjusted to avoid intolerable
remedial costs. In the ICTs, possibilities include making retrial a realistic option by creating expedited retrial procedures and a retrial
exception to temporary Tribunals’ expiration dates, by providing more
limited alternatives to retrials such as liberalized admission of new
evidence on appeal, and by lowering hurdles for interlocutory appeals
to allow lower-cost ex ante rights adjudication.
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In the second set of proposals, I argue for modification of international courts’ absolutist approach to the effective-remedy requirement. Specifically, international courts should shift from a “rightsmaximizing” approach to remedies—in which remedies are designed
to vindicate the underlying rights at all costs—toward an “interestbalancing” approach.3 After determining what the effective remedy
for a particular case would be, courts should treat that remedy as presumptively required but should permit departure from that requirement in the face of strong, legitimate countervailing considerations.
This interest-balancing approach has some doctrinal support in international law’s sporadic embrace of equity, and it need not do violence
to the core purposes of the effective-remedy requirement. Indeed, it
could serve those purposes better than international courts’ current
approach, provided that the balancing calculus gives adequate weight
to the rights at stake. In cases involving untenable remedial costs,
interest balancing could allow the court to devise a less costly partial
remedy—better for the victim than the outcome of remedial deterrence, which is usually no remedy. It would also promote judicial
candor, empowering courts to grapple openly with remedial shortfall.
Part I of this Article briefly describes the basic remedial principles that have dominated the approaches taken by international courts
and human rights scholars. It also briefly introduces a body of U.S.
constitutional scholarship dealing with the relationship between rights
and remedies, from which this Article draws a number of conceptual
tools. Part II sets forth the Article’s central descriptive claims about
remedial deterrence dynamics, while Part III considers these
dynamics’ normative consequences and makes proposals for institutional design and remedial decisionmaking. Finally, the Conclusion
offers preliminary thoughts about the implications of remedial deterrence at international courts for other actors, such as national courts
and legislatures, that rely on international judicial doctrine when
interpreting their own human rights obligations.

REMEDIES

IN

I
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

International courts and scholars habitually invoke the principle
of ubi ius ibi remedium—“where there is a right, there is a remedy.”4
This Part addresses the origins, scope, and current prevalence of that
3 See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 588–89 (1983) (using
these terms to describe approaches to U.S. constitutional remedies).
4 E.g., Lisa J. Laplante, The Law of Remedies and the Clean Hands Doctrine: Exclusionary Reparation Policies in Peru’s Political Transition, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 51, 56–57
(2007).
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principle. The first Section discusses the treatment of remedies in the
case law of international courts. Section B then considers the limited
existing human rights scholarship on this point and briefly introduces
a much more extensive body of scholarship addressing right-remedy
gaps in U.S. constitutional law.
A. Remedial Doctrine in International Courts
The leading international formulation of the “no right without a
remedy” principle comes from the 1928 holding of the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the Chorzów Factory case:
“[I]t is a principle of international law, and even a general conception
of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to
make reparation.”5 The Court further specified—in “[o]ne of the
most oft-quoted passages in international law”6—that the applicable
remedial principle was restoration of the status quo ante:
The essential principle . . . is that reparation must, as far as possible,
wipe out all consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not
been committed. [It must consist of r]estitution in kind, or, if this is
not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a
restitution in kind would bear.7

This Article refers to this remedial principle as the “full remedy
rule,” in that it permits no remedial shortfall (except in cases of
impossibility); whatever damages cannot be corrected through in-kind
restitution must otherwise be fully compensated. It has been reiterated repeatedly by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the PCIJ’s
successor and the most prominent international court, in a wide
variety of international legal disputes.8 The ICJ’s continued adherence to the rule persists in some tension with its reliance on certain
5 Chorzów Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (Sept. 13)
(emphasis added).
6 Dinah Shelton, Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility,
96 AM. J. INT’L L. 833, 835 (2002).
7 Chorzów Factory, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (emphasis added).
8 See, e.g., Armed Activities on Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Gen. List No. 116, at 82 (I.C.J. Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/116/10455.pdf (finding Uganda has obligation to make full reparations to D.R.C. for
injuries caused); Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 198 (July 9) (finding Israel must make reparations for damages caused in constructing wall); Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex.
v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 59–60 (Mar. 31) (finding U.S. obligated to permit review of
Mexican nationals’ cases to remedy violations); Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem.
Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 31–32 (Feb. 14) (finding Belgium must cancel unlawful
arrest warrant as remedy); Gabčı́kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7,
80–81 (Sept. 25) (finding both countries responsible and entitled to compensation).
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equitable principles.9 Nonetheless, Chorzów Factory remains good
law and is in fact “the cornerstone of international claims for reparations, whether presented by states or other litigants.”10 The International Law Commission’s recent report containing draft articles on
state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts (Articles), a
highly influential but not legally binding document, likewise requires
violators not only to cease the offending conduct11 but also to “make
full reparation” for “any damage, whether material or moral.”12
Commentaries on the Articles explain that they codify the Chorzów
Factory rule,13 which the drafters considered uncontroversial.14
Chorzów Factory and its direct successors in the ICJ, as well as
the Articles, concern the law of state responsibility, which governs disputes between states, i.e., violations of states’ obligations toward one
another under treaties or customary international law.15 Human
rights law, in contrast, governs the relationship between states and
individuals. But the remedial principles governing human rights law,
a younger field, are heavily influenced by the Chorzów Factory line.16
Nearly every major human rights treaty includes a provision
establishing an individual right to an effective remedy for violations of
the other rights outlined in the treaty.17 This right is generally under9 See infra Part III.C (discussing how to balance victim’s interest in effective remedies
with countervailing considerations).
10 Shelton, supra note 6, at 836. For instance, the rule has long been followed at arbitral tribunals. E.g., S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, 40 I.L.M. 1408, 1443–44 (2001) (NAFTA
Arb. Trib. Nov. 13, 2000); Martini Co. (Italy v. Venez.) 2 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 975 (1949)
(May 3, 1930), translated in 25 AM. J. INT’L L. 554, 584–85 (1931).
11 G.A. Res. 56/83, Annex art. 30, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83/Annex (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter ILC Articles].
12 Id. art. 31.
13 THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY:
INTRODUCTION, TEXT, AND COMMENTARIES 202, 211, 213–14 (James Crawford ed., 2002)
[hereinafter COMMENTARIES].
14 Id. at 212; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 901 & n.3 (1990) (endorsing full remedy rule).
15 But see Reparation for Injuries Suffered in Service of United Nations, Advisory
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 184 (Apr. 11) (applying Chorzów Factory principle to claims
brought by United Nations).
16 See DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 99 (2d ed.
2005) (“[I]nstitutions applying [human rights law] return to the law of state responsibility
to assess the nature and extent of the remedies.”); Shelton, supra note 6, at 834 (observing
that ILC Articles are increasingly incorporated into unilateral treaties between states and
individuals).
17 E.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 8, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to an
effective remedy . . . for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him . . . .”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 2(3), 9(5), 14(6), Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC.
DOC. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (ensuring remedies and compensation for wrongful convictions and imprisonment); Convention on Elimination of All
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stood to encompass both the procedural right of access to a hearing
before an impartial decisionmaker and the substantive right to receive
relief.18 This Article addresses only the substantive component; I use
the term “remedy” to refer only to the actual relief ordered by a court
after finding a human rights violation, not to the initial procedural
right of access to a court to bring the human rights claim in the first
place. The “effective remedy” treaty provisions directly govern remedies provided by national authorities and also indirectly support international courts’ remedial rules.19 Some human rights treaties also
directly authorize or require international judicial remedies. For
instance, Article 63(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights
requires the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to order, “if
appropriate, that the consequences of [any Convention violation] be
remedied and that fair compensation be paid.”20
These treaty provisions usually use general terms like “effective,”
“fair,” or “adequate,”21 which appear to allow courts considerable
flexibility. Yet international courts have typically construed them
quite strictly. The most common interpretation, especially in cases
involving claims for money damages, simply applies the Chorzów FacForms of Racial Discrimination art. 6, Mar. 7, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. C, 95-2 (1978), 660
U.N.T.S. 195 (“State Parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies.”); Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women art. 2(c), Dec. 18, 1979, S. EXEC. DOC. R, 96-2 (1980), 1249 U.N.T.S. 13
(establishing legal protection of women’s rights against any act of discrimination); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
art. 14, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (“Each State
Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim . . . obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation . . . .”); Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, Written
Statement to Ad-Hoc Committee on Disability Rights Convention, Need for an Effective
Domestic Remedy in the Disability Rights Convention, Jan. 2005, available at http://www.
un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc5docs/ahc5icj.rtf (“The right to an effective remedy is
so firmly enshrined . . . that any credible modern human rights treaty has to incorporate
it.”).
18 SHELTON, supra note 16, at 7–8. Human rights lawyers sometimes use the term “reparations” to refer to remedies in the substantive sense, although that term is similarly
ambiguous. Id. at 7–8, 50. See generally S.L. Haasdijk, The Lack of Uniformity in the
Terminology of the International Law of Remedies, 5 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 245 (1992) (discussing inconsistent terminology for remedies and how ILC has dealt with this problem).
19 SHELTON, supra note 16, at 114.
20 American Convention on Human Rights art. 63(1), Nov. 22, 1969, S. EXEC. DOC. F,
95-2 (1978), 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 [hereinafter American Convention]; see also Convention
for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 41, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ.
T.S. No. 5, as amended by Protocol No. 11 [hereinafter European Convention] (requiring
ECHR to give “just satisfaction” to injured party if only partial reparation has been made).
21 Various soft-law documents provide some elucidation. See, e.g., Comm’n on Human
Rights, Gen. Comment 31, Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties
to the Covenant, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) (holding that
remedy provision of ICCPR entails compensation and other measures); SHELTON, supra
note 16, at 121–22 (discussing other human rights reports on restitution).
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tory full remedy rule. The Inter-American Court, for instance, has
held that Article 63(1) codifies the Chorzów Factory rule.22 In its first
merits case, the Court specified: “Reparation of harm brought about
by the violation of an international obligation consists in full restitution . . . which includes the restoration of the prior situation, the reparation of the consequences of the violation, and indemnification for
patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages.”23
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has likewise
interpreted the European Convention on Human Rights to essentially
codify the full remedy rule in most cases. The Convention permits the
ECHR, upon finding a violation, to remand the case to national
authorities for the selection of an effective remedy24—and the Court
has consistently held that such a remedy must “restore as far as possible the situation existing before the breach.”25 Where domestic law
does not provide for full compensation, but instead “allows only partial reparation,” Article 41 provides that the Court shall make up the
difference by ordering some form of “just satisfaction.”26 The
ECHR’s Article 41 jurisprudence has not been wholly consistent with
the Chorzów Factory approach—one line of cases permits merely
declaratory relief to be treated as just satisfaction for certain nonpecuniary injuries.27 But in other cases, the Court typically grants
damage remedies that are expressly designed to make the victim
whole.28 It has likewise interpreted some of the Convention’s substantive rights provisions to implicitly require remedies for their violation, including compensation commensurate with the damage.29
22 Garrido & Baigorria Case, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 39, at 10 (Aug. 27,
1998); accord Durand & Ugarte Case, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 89, at 6
(Aug. 16, 2000) (“[A]ny violation of an international obligation carries with it the obligation to make adequate reparation.”).
23 Velásquez-Rodrı́guez Case, 1989 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 7, at 8 (July 21,
1989).
24 E.g., Salah v. Netherlands, App. No. 8196/02, ¶¶ 70–71 (E.C.H.R. Mar. 8, 2007),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (reading Articles 41 and 46 of the
European Convention together to permit such remand). European Court of Human
Rights judgments and decisions may be accessed at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc
(follow “HUDOC Database” hyperlink; then select “Decisions” and “Judgments” under
“ECHR Document Collections” heading at left, and enter case title in “Case Title” field;
then click “Search” button).
25 Lustig-Prean v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 31417/96, 32377/96, Judgment (Just Satisfaction), ¶ 22 (E.C.H.R. July 25, 2000), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc
(for instructions on locating documents within “HUDOC Database,” see supra note 24).
26 European Convention, supra note 20, art. 41.
27 See infra notes 217–19, 339 and accompanying text.
28 See, e.g., Gongadze v. Ukraine, App. No. 34056/02, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 195–98;
Scozzari v. Italy [GC], App. Nos. 39221/98, 41963/98, 2000-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 249–50.
29 See, e.g., Öneryildiz v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), ¶¶ 90–92, 113, 116, 121 (E.C.H.R. June 18, 2002), available at http://www.echr.coe.
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The right to an effective remedy also governs cases involving
criminal defendants’ procedural rights, including those in International Criminal Tribunals (ICTs)—the principal focus of this Article.
The ICTs are not “human rights courts” as such, but they regularly
interpret and apply human rights treaties when considering defendants’ procedural rights.30 The jurisprudence of the ICTR and ICTY,
including that of their shared Appeals Chamber, establishes that “any
violation of the accused’s rights entails the provision of an effective
remedy.”31 The case law does not go into much detail as to the content of this requirement.32 As Part II demonstrates, the ICTs rarely
recognize prejudicial violations of defendants’ human rights and
therefore rarely reach the remedial stage. Thus, they have had little
opportunity to elaborate on their remedial principles.
In the criminal procedure context, the Chorzów Factory approach
is complicated by the types of remedies available. Criminal procedure
remedies typically do not involve money damages, and thus courts
usually do not attempt to quantify the harm and award precise relief.
ICTs do sometimes use the remedy of sentence reduction; like damages, this remedy offers a continuum of possible outcomes and can be
adjusted to reflect the magnitude of the particular injury.33 But traditional criminal procedure remedies are blunter instruments—a defendant gets a new trial or not, gets charges dismissed or not, and so
forth. When such remedies are granted, they can be windfalls to the
defendant, making him better off than he would have been absent the
int/echr/en/hudoc (for instructions on locating documents within “HUDOC Database,” see
supra note 24).
30 See supra note 2 and accompanying text (discussing law applied by ICTs); see, e.g.,
Kajelijeli v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-A, Judgment, ¶ 255 (May 23, 2005) [hereinafter Kajelijeli Judgment] (citing effective-remedy provision of ICCPR).
31 Kajelijeli Judgment, supra note 30, ¶¶ 254–55, 322; Rwamakuba v. Prosecutor, Case
No. ICTR 98-44C-A, Decision on Appeal Against Decision on Appropriate Remedy,
¶¶ 23–26 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Rwamakuba Remedy Appeal]; Barayagwiza v.
Prosecutor (Barayagwiza I), Case No. ICTR 97-19-A, Decision, ¶¶ 72, 108 (Nov. 3, 1999)
[hereinafter Barayagwiza I Decision]; Čelebići Case, Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on
Application for Leave To Appeal (Provisional Release) by Hazim Delić, ¶ 16 (Nov. 22,
1996).
32 Rule 5 of the Tribunals’ respective Rules of Procedure and Evidence gives the Trial
Chamber broad discretion over remedies for mere Rules violations, but this Rule is not
typically cited in cases involving violations of human rights law. Int’l Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY], Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 5, U.N. Doc. IT/
32/Rev.40 (June 12, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/index.htm [hereinafter ICTY Rules]; Int’l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR], Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, Rule 5 (June 15, 2007), available at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/rules/150607/
rop-150607.pdf [hereinafter ICTR Rules].
33 See infra note 42 and accompanying text (giving example of use of sentence reduction to correspond to magnitude of rights violation).
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violation.34 Criminal procedure remedies thus often exceed the
requirements of the full remedy rule.
Despite these complexities, the ICTs’ remedial approaches are
consistent with those of other international courts in the most important sense. To use Paul Gewirtz’s distinction, discussed at length in
Part III.C, the ICTs have been “rights maximizers”—taking “the
viewpoint of [defendants] alone”—rather than “interest balancers.”35
Under a rights-maximizing approach, the remedy is determined by the
violation and the resulting injury, not by competing considerations
such as broader social interests. The court asks only what harm was
done to the victim of the violation, and seeks a remedy that is commensurate with that harm in some meaningful way—it does not ask
about potentially harmful effects that the remedy might have on other
people or institutions.36 The ICTs do sometimes cite other considerations like deterrence of prosecutorial misconduct, but only to justify
remedies that are broader than necessary to compensate the victim
fully.37 And once the Tribunals decide what kind of remedy is “effective” for a given category of violations, they do not suggest that this
remedy could be cut back on the basis of high remedial costs.
Like other international courts, the ICTs seek a fit between rights
and remedies. As the Appeals Chamber recently put it, “the nature
and form of the effective remedy should be proportional to the gravity
of the harm that is suffered.”38 For instance, having found that the
defendant was unlawfully detained, the ICTR Appeals Chamber in
the Kajelijeli case invoked the effective-remedy requirement of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The
Appeals Chamber held that a sentence reduction, beyond mere credit
for time served, was the remedy proportionate to the violation.39 In
Barayagwiza, discussed in the next Part,40 the Appeals Chamber initially found that a lengthy unlawful detention merited dismissal of all
charges with prejudice.41 Subsequently, upon introduction of new
34 See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Risks to Equal Protection in the Criminal Justice
System, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2098, 2111 (2001) (noting “oft-heard complaint” that dismissal
remedies “are windfalls to defendants”).
35 See Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 588–89 (discussing rights-maximizing approach to U.S.
constitutional law).
36 Id. at 591.
37 See, e.g., Barayagwiza I Decision, supra note 31, ¶ 76; see also infra note 366 and
accompanying text (discussing Inter-American Court of Human Rights cases).
38 Rwamakuba Remedy Appeal, supra note 31, ¶ 27.
39 Kajelijeli Judgment, supra note 30, ¶¶ 255, 322 (citing effective-remedy provision of
ICCPR); accord Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR 97-20-A, Judgment, ¶ 325
(May 20, 2005).
40 See infra text accompanying notes 109–20.
41 Barayagwiza I Decision, supra note 31, ¶¶ 100–12.
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facts, the Appeals Chamber changed its assessment of the underlying
violations’ seriousness, finding that the defendant had been detained
impermissibly for less time and thus suffered a less serious injury. It
reduced the remedy accordingly, granting a sentence reduction
instead.42 Similarly, in the rare cases where the Appeals Chamber has
identified prejudicial fair-trial violations, it has vacated convictions on
the relevant charges and reduced sentences accordingly.43
In sum, while the precise contours of the right to an effective
remedy remain contested, international courts have consistently
treated the right as a powerful constraint on their remedial discretion.
They have been “rights maximizers” almost across the board. With
the limited exception of some expropriation cases,44 international
courts have never openly endorsed the idea that a gap between rights
and remedies could be justified by competing interests. The specific
remedies that they adopt are determined by the nature of the violation and are, at least purportedly, designed to make the victim whole.
They have not limited these remedies on the basis of countervailing
interests, such as the public interest in punishing major crimes or
other social welfare concerns. They have, in essence, treated the
“right to an effective remedy” as an absolute right, or nearly so.
Under this approach, if remedial costs are to be accommodated, it
cannot be at the remedial stage—something else has to give.

42 Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor (Barayagwiza II), Case No. ICTR 97-19-AR72, Decision
(Prosecutor’s Request for Review or Reconsideration), ¶¶ 51–75 (Mar. 31, 2000) [hereinafter Barayagwiza II Decision].
43 See infra notes 196–201 and accompanying text (arguing that these were lowremedial-cost situations).
44 The law of takings is the sole area in which some international courts have rejected
the Chorzów Factory rule—a surprising fact, given that Chorzów Factory itself was an
expropriation case. Today, many treaties require “just” or “adequate” compensation for
expropriation, which arguably permits compensation below full market value if valid competing considerations demand it. Papachelas v. Greece, App. No. 31423/96, 1999-II Eur.
Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 44, 48; Scordino v. Italy [GC], App. No. 36813/97, Judgment (Merits and Just
Satisfaction), ¶ 257 (E.C.H.R. Mar. 29, 2006), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/
hudoc (for instructions on locating documents within “HUDOC Database,” see supra note
24). Even in the takings area, however, the full remedy rule still predominates. See, e.g.,
ADC Affiliate Ltd. v. Hungary, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/16, ¶¶ 497–500
(Oct. 2, 2006); Papamichalopoulos v. Greece, App. No. 14556/89, 330-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) ¶ 36 (1995); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 712 (1990).
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B. Scholarship on Remedies in Human Rights Law
Human rights scholarship on the substantive aspect of the right to
a remedy is relatively limited.45 But to the extent it has considered
the question, existing scholarship has almost uniformly endorsed the
proposition that all human rights violations require a remedy. As
Dinah Shelton, the author of the leading book on remedies in human
rights law, put it: “Rights without remedies are ineffectual, rendering
illusory the government’s duty to respect such rights.”46 Many
scholars have specifically endorsed the Chorzów Factory formulation
of the full remedy rule.47 Two of the leading scholars, Theo Van
Boven and M. Cherif Bassiouni, were appointed successively by the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights as Special Rapporteurs on remedies. They produced Basic Principles that emphasize a right of reparation for human rights violations “proportional to the gravity of the
violations and the harm suffered.”48 This right includes restoration, so
far as possible, of the status quo ante, as well as compensation for all
damages.49
Beyond invocation of the full remedy rule and the right to an
effective remedy, however, human rights scholars have had little to
say about the legal theories surrounding the relationship between
rights and remedies.50 They have treated that relationship as unidirec45 There is a comparatively substantial literature that addresses the procedural aspect
of the right to an effective remedy, see supra note 18 and accompanying text, including the
scholarship on exhaustion of local remedies, e.g., SHELTON, supra note 16, at 7, 114.
46 SHELTON, supra note 16, at 100; see also Laplante, supra note 4, at 54–57 (discussing
right-remedy principle in modern reparations jurisprudence); Naomi Rohrt-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 157, 157 (2004) (“It
is a basic maxim of law that harms should be remedied.”); Shelton, supra note 6, at 835
(propounding basic principle that “an international delict generates an obligation of reparation”); Nagendra Singh, Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 12 (Paul De Waart et al. eds., 1988) (arguing
focus should be on enforcement of remedies rather than on “rights without any method or
machinery to enforce them”).
47 E.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, Restitution as a Remedy in U.S. Courts for Violations of
International Law, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 343 (2001) (calling Chorzów Factory rule “the
basic remedial norm for violations of international law”); Jeremy Sarkin, Reparation for
Past Wrongs: Using Domestic Courts Around the World, Especially the United States, To
Pursue African Human Rights Claims, 32 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 426, 430 & n.13 (2004)
(endorsing full remedy rule); Shelton, supra note 6, at 835, 845 (endorsing full remedy rule
but noting that some of its formulations “are too general to provide practical guidance”).
48 U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law, ¶¶ 11, 15–16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62, Annex (Jan. 18, 2000) (prepared by M. Cherif Bassiouni).
49 Id. ¶¶ 21–23 (stating that restitution should restore victim to status quo).
50 See SHELTON, supra note 16, at 7 (noting that theories of remedies are rarely
discussed).
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tional, with remedies flowing from the nature and scope of rights violations. No existing literature addresses the adverse effects that
international courts’ remedial rules may have on their interpretation
of rights. Scholars have offered little guidance on dealing with situations in which full compensation may be impossible or undesirable.
With two limited exceptions—namely, the respective literatures surrounding property expropriation and mass claims procedures for
large-scale violations51—scholars have not developed principles for
identifying second-best, less-than-full remedies, nor have they developed principles for determining whether remedial shortfall is permissible in a given situation.
To the extent that existing human rights scholarship mentions
right-remedy gaps at all, it typically condemns them. It is commonplace in the literature to note the sharp disparity between ambitious
treaty provisions and the stark realities of weak enforcement and
widespread violation.52 Because of this disparity, contemporary
human rights scholarship and advocacy have substantially shifted
focus from rights articulation to enforcement53—one factor driving
the recent proliferation of international courts.54 Scholars have
pushed for new courts to have strong remedial powers,55 and have
often criticized courts that have been cautious in their remedial jurisprudence.56 In short, the prevailing stance on remedies is “the more
the better.”
51 See supra note 44 (discussing international courts’ occasional willingness to deviate
from full remedy in expropriation cases); infra note 345 and accompanying text (discussing
exception to full remedy in mass-abuse situations based on claim that full reparation is
impossible).
52 E.g., Rohrt-Arriaza, supra note 46, at 157–58 (noting that few remedies are paid,
despite availability of reparations); Dinah Shelton, International Human Rights Law: Principled, Double, or Absent Standards?, 25 LAW & INEQ. 467, 470 (2007) (noting weak
enforcement); Singh, supra note 46, at 12 (finding it easier to define rights than to translate
them into enforceable law); Beth Stephens, Book Review, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 257, 257
(2001) (reviewing DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
(1st ed. 1999)) (stating that rights are often violated in practice).
53 Shelton, supra note 52, at 472 (arguing for “further development of independent
bodies”).
54 See, e.g., Fausto Pocar, The Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: A
Necessity in the Current International Community, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 304, 307 (2004)
(describing proliferation).
55 E.g., Manfred Nowak, The Need for a World Court of Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 251, 254–58 (2007) (calling for new court of human rights); Shelton, supra note 52, at
471–72 (advocating continued development of regional bodies); see also Adrian Di
Giovanni, The Prospect of ICC Reparations in the Case Concerning Northern Uganda: On
a Collision Course with Incoherence?, 2 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 25, 39–44 (2006) (discussing International Criminal Court’s novel reparations mechanism).
56 E.g., Shelton, supra note 16, at 181 (noting that conservativism of European Court
has “solidified into an unsatisfactory jurisprudence”); SALVATORE ZAPPALÀ, HUMAN
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This stance, while attractive in many ways, is misguided. I do not
deny or defend the enormous gap between human rights on paper and
on the ground, and I welcome the shift in focus toward enforcement.
But as Part II shows, strong remedial rules actually undermine effective rights enforcement in some cases. The existing literature has
ignored these remedial deterrence effects and their normative consequences for remedial jurisprudence and institutional design.
In contrast, a broad and rich body of scholarship addresses analogous questions concerning the relationship between rights and remedies in U.S. constitutional law.57 I draw from that scholarship a
number of useful conceptual tools and therefore offer here a bit of
background on U.S. constitutional remedies. The Chorzów Factory
principles will look familiar to U.S. scholars (as they will to those of
RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 150 (2003) (arguing that international criminal procedure rules should include specific sanctions and exclusionary rules);
see also Shelton, supra note 6, at 837 (criticizing ILC Articles).
57 E.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1284 (1976) (claiming that extensive judicial involvement in public law is desirable); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—And Their
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 635–36 (2006) (arguing that availability of remedies influences justiciability doctrines); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J.
Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1731, 1736 (1991) (arguing that there must be effective remedies for constitutional violations to limit government even where there are retroactivity concerns); Owen Fiss, The
Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 44–58
(1979) [hereinafter Fiss, Forms of Justice] (arguing that rights and remedies are phases in
judicial process of expounding public values); Owen Fiss, The Jurisprudence of Busing,
1975 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 194, 194–96 [hereinafter Fiss, Jurisprudence of Busing]
(examining remedial-cost trade-offs in constitutional suits); William Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 636
(1981) (distinguishing legitimate judicial remedial discretion from illegitimate remedial discretion); Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 738 (1992) (arguing that courts respond to popular will through process of remediation); Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 589 (examining pressure on courts to
approve imperfect remedies); Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal
Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2004 (1998) (exploring complications in defining
rights and remedies when Equal Protection Clause applies in criminal adjudication);
Levinson, supra note 1, at 859–60 (arguing for broader understanding of “right-remedy
relationship in constitutional law”); Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional
Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2538 (1998) (distilling “broader remedial principles from our
constitutional text, structure, and tradition” and evaluating nonliability for and
nonreviewability of certain constitutional violations); Kent Roach, The Limits of Corrective Justice and the Potential of Equity in Constitutional Remedies, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 859,
861 (1991) (arguing that corrective justice cannot explain courts’ application of remedies in
recognition of rights of third parties); Peter M. Shane, Rights, Remedies, and Restraint, 64
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 531, 533 (1988) (noting that rule of law may compel judicial opposition
to political branches); Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1, 26–34 (1989) (arguing that courts’ applications of remedies affect landscape that those courts are addressing). For citations to other works, see Friedman, supra,
at 736 n.4.
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many other domestic systems58). Although the U.S. Constitution does
not codify a right to an effective remedy, the premise that violations of
a right demand a remedy has been part of U.S. constitutional law
since Marbury v. Madison,59 with even older roots in the English
common law.60 Moreover, U.S. constitutional remedies long operated
on a private law model, under which the remedy flowed more or less
automatically from the violation; the remedy was whatever would
make the victim whole.61
In recent decades, however, scholars have called these assumptions into question. They have recognized that in practice, although
“[e]ffective remedies have always been available for most violations of
[constitutional] rights,”62 right-remedy gaps have long been ubiquitous,63 even since Marbury itself.64 They have argued that in modern
U.S. public law litigation, the simple make-whole remedial approach
has been displaced by complicated, discretionary choices that take
into account the broader social impact of court-ordered institutional
reforms.65 And they have demonstrated that fears concerning the
costs of implementing remedies for rights violations influence U.S.
58 See, e.g., J.A.E. Pottow, Constitutional Remedies in the Criminal Context: A Unified
Approach to Section 24 (Part II), 44 CRIM. L.Q. 34, 60 (2000) (discussing relationship
between rights and remedies in Canadian law).
59 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
60 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES *23 (stating maxim that “where there
is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy”); ALBERT V. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 199 (10th ed. 1959) (“[T]he Englishmen
whose labours gradually framed the complicated set of laws and institutions which we call
the Constitution, fixed their minds . . . on providing remedies for the enforcement of particular rights or . . . for averting definite wrongs . . . .”). Indeed, prominent common law
jurists once argued that all wrongful injuries required a remedy, but it has now long been
recognized that not every interest that can be injured amounts to a legally protected right.
See Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 1025–56 (discussing recognition of category of
damnum absque injuria).
61 Chayes, supra note 57, at 1282–83 (describing private law model); Roach, supra note
57, at 868–69 (discussing traditional notion that victim should be made whole); see, e.g.,
Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971) (holding that remedy must repair
violation “to the greatest possible degree”).
62 Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 57, at 1786 (emphasis added).
63 See id. at 1765, 1778, 1784 (arguing that damages do not make plaintiff whole); Fiss,
Forms of Justice, supra note 57, at 52 (claiming that rights can exist in absence of remedies); Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 590–91 (noting that remedies will always be imperfect);
Meltzer, supra note 57, at 2559, 2564 (noting right-remedy gaps in context of writ of habeas
corpus and injunctive relief).
64 Friedman, supra note 57, at 737 (observing that Marbury received no remedy
because of “concocted” jurisdictional conflict).
65 Chayes, supra note 57, at 1296–1302 (describing discretionary choices); Fiss, Forms
of Justice, supra note 57, at 47 (rejecting deductive and formal notion of remedies); Roach,
supra note 57, at 867 (noting that remedies flow from practical and equitable considerations); see infra Part III.C (discussing remedial interest balancing).
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courts’ interpretation of rights.66 These contentions are contested
even within the U.S. literature and certainly cannot just be transposed
to the international setting. Nonetheless, international human rights
law does face analogous questions about the right-remedy relationship. This Article seeks to bring insights from U.S. domestic scholarship to bear on those questions while exploring the implications of
differences in the international law and criminal procedure context. I
also hope to offer a modest contribution to those ongoing U.S.
debates: some useful case studies of the consequences of strong remedial rules operating against the background of hard institutional constraints, and a few new thoughts on what to do about those
consequences.
II
REMEDIAL DETERRENCE

IN

INTERNATIONAL COURTS

This Part demonstrates that remedial costs sometimes drive international courts to distort their jurisprudence substantially in earlier
stages of human rights adjudication. Borrowing from U.S. constitutional scholarship, I refer to this phenomenon as “remedial deterrence.”67 I illustrate my argument principally with criminal procedure
cases from two international criminal tribunals. These tribunals face
particularly potent remedial deterrence pressures. As Section A of
this Part explains, the costs, length, and political prominence of their
trials make it prohibitively costly for the tribunals to order the standard remedies for serious and prejudicial criminal procedure violations, namely release or retrial. These costs have driven the tribunals
to avoid granting any remedy at all, by adopting one of the three strategies I describe in Sections B, C, and D: narrow construction of
defendants’ rights, reliance on procedural hurdles to avoid reaching
the merits, and adjustment of the burden of proof of prejudice. The
last strategy has served as an almost-impregnable barrier to rights
claims relating to trial fairness, while the first two have been
employed primarily with respect to other kinds of claims, especially
alleged pretrial violations. Section E considers whether these observations can be extrapolated to other international courts that hear
66 E.g., Fiss, Jurisprudence of Busing, supra note 57, at 195–96 (examining costs of
desegregation decrees); Friedman, supra note 57, at 738 (noting that courts interpret rights
in response to pressure from political majorities); Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1370 (2001) (noting that institutional competence
concerns lead to reduced remedies); Levinson, supra note 1, at 889–99 (discussing costs of
expanding constitutional rights). For a more detailed discussion with examples of these
dynamics, see infra notes 130–35 and accompanying text.
67 See supra note 1 (discussing Daryl Levinson’s use of this phrase).
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human rights claims and briefly describes another strategy some such
courts have employed—the dilution of their definition of effective
remedies.
A. The Cost of Remedies in International Criminal Proceedings
The ICTY and ICTR are sister institutions established by the
U.N. Security Council in 1993 and 1994, respectively.68 Their jurisdiction, as defined by their respective statutes, is to try individual defendants for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity
committed during the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s or in Rwanda and
neighboring states during 1994.69 The two Tribunals share an Appeals
Chamber,70 have nearly identical Statutes and Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, and have mostly harmonized their case law, though particular institutional concerns have created a few differences.71
Although the ICTs are not “human rights courts” as such, they
are important interpreters of human rights law and are among the
most prominent and influential modern international courts. They are
the first international criminal tribunals since Nuremberg and Tokyo,
setting the stage for the new, permanent International Criminal Court
(ICC) and for several hybrid domestic/international criminal courts.72
They are bound by their statutes to respect the procedural human
rights of their defendants73 and have developed a rich body of jurisprudence on criminal procedure rights, some of which is discussed in
this Part.
Human rights law constrains government misconduct in the criminal process in ways similar, but not identical, to the constraints pro68 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704, annex (1993) 32 I.L.M. 1192 (2003),
adopted in S.C. Res 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute];
Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, 33 I.L.M. 1602 (1994), adopted in United
Nations Security Council Resolution 955 Establishing the International Tribunal for
Rwanda (with Annexed Statute), S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 106, 49 U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
69 ICTY Statute, supra note 68, arts. 2–5; ICTR Statute, supra note 68, arts. 2–4.
70 More precisely, the ICTY and ICTR Appeals Chambers have the same judges but
are formally distinct, and they treat one another’s holdings as binding. Mark A. Drumbl &
Kenneth S. Gallant, Appeals in the Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
589, 633–34 (2001).
71 See infra note 150 (discussing provisional release).
72 Sonja Starr, Extraordinary Crimes at Ordinary Times: International Justice Beyond
Crisis Situations, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1257, 1267 (2007) (noting that ICTY and ICTR case
law has influenced hybrid tribunals and ICC).
73 ICTY Statute, supra note 68, art. 21; ICTR Statute, supra note 68, art. 20; see also
supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing Tribunals’ invocation of human rights
treaties in their jurisprudence).
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vided by constitutional criminal procedure in the United States and
other domestic systems. For instance, Article 9 of the ICCPR provides protections against arbitrary arrest and detention.74 Article 14
provides for fair, speedy, and public trials before impartial tribunals,
the presumption of innocence, the right to clear notice of charges, the
right to counsel and to the time and resources necessary to prepare a
defense, confrontation rights, freedom from self-incrimination, the
right to an appeal, and protection from double jeopardy.75 Article 17
bars unreasonable interferences with privacy.76 Other human rights
treaties provide similar sets of protections,77 and criminal procedure
cases have been a central part of human rights courts’ dockets.78 And
as discussed in Part I.A, the ICCPR and other human rights treaties
require “effective remedies” for violations of all of these rights,79 and
ICTs have taken a “rights-maximizing” approach to the enforcement
of this requirement.80
It may seem strange to focus on the ICTs’ procedural jurisprudence—that is, on the rights of accused perpetrators of atrocities
rather than those of the victims of the atrocities. After all, the victims
rarely receive any direct remedy for their suffering; the ICTY and
ICTR do not provide victim reparations,81 though the ICC is expected
to do so.82 Notwithstanding this incongruence, however, human rights
scholars and advocates should care about defendants’ rights at the
ICTs. First, of course, not all of the accused are necessarily guilty,83
and they face grave sentences. Due process thus matters for the same
well-accepted reasons it matters in domestic trials for serious crimes.
74

ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 9.
Id. art. 14.
76 Id. art. 17.
77 E.g., European Convention, supra note 20, arts. 5–8 (providing protections for
defendants); American Convention, supra note 20, arts. 5, 7, 8, 11 (same).
78 STEFAN TRECHSEL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 7 (2005).
79 See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
80 See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
81 Starr, supra note 72, at 1257 n.150.
82 See, e.g., Di Giovanni, supra note 55, at 39–44 (discussing ICC reparations mechanism). Nonetheless, remedial deterrence dynamics at the ICTs may have potentially
serious implications for the design and effectiveness of the new victim reparations mechanism at the ICC, and perhaps for other future tribunals. It is easy to imagine that victim
reparations claims could impose significant remedial costs—for instance, that a mass claim
in a single case could bankrupt the ICC’s Trust Fund for Victims, which is designed to
compensate victims where the perpetrators themselves have insufficient assets, id. at
49–50—and that courts could respond to these costs by cutting back either victims’ rights
or the underlying definitions of international crimes that trigger reparations awards.
83 Most have been acquitted on the merits of at least some counts—and a few on all
counts. See ICTY Cases and Judgments, Indictments and Proceedings, http://www.un.org/
icty/cases-e/index-e.htm (compiling information on disposition of every ICTY case); ICTR,
Status of Cases, http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/status.htm (same for ICTR).
75
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Moreover, perceived fairness is also crucial to many of the Tribunals’
central transitional justice objectives: helping to stabilize fragile democratic governments and regional peace in the affected countries, contributing to the development of international jurisprudence, and
serving as a model for human rights protection and the rule of law.84
Trial fairness has thus been treated as a principal objective by nearly
everyone involved with the ICTs’ creation85 and operation,86 as well
as nearly every scholar writing about them.87 It is routinely invoked in
the Tribunals’ jurisprudence and the public statements of judges and
prosecutors,88 even if the Tribunals’ doctrines in some respects fall
short of fulfilling that objective in practice.
In addition, international institutions’ treatment of their own
human rights violations may be important to the credibility of international human rights law more broadly: When promoting norms
throughout the world, it helps to keep your own house clean. At least
some of the ICTs’ judges see the Tribunals as models for other courts’
treatment of defendants and point out that respecting due process is
crucial to that mission.89 Indeed, the ICTs’ procedural rules and juris84 E.g., Jacob Katz Cogan, International Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 111, 114 (2002) (noting that fairness of proceedings in ad hoc
tribunals is essential to legitimacy); Mark C. Fleming, Appellate Review in the International
Criminal Tribunals, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 111, 115–16 (2002) (claiming that tribunals exist to
try defendants fairly); Göran Sluiter, Fairness and the Interests of Justice, 3 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 9, 19 (2005) (arguing that trial unfairness will lead to criticisms of authority).
85 See, e.g., ICTY Statute, supra note 68, art. 20 (“Trial Chambers shall ensure that a
trial is fair and expeditious . . . .”).
86 See infra notes 88–89.
87 E.g., Cogan, supra note 84, at 114 (arguing that trials should not be perceived as
unfair); Laurel E. Fletcher, From Indifference to Engagement, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1013,
1082 (2005) (claiming that ad hoc tribunals must be respected as complying with notions of
fundamental fairness); Sluiter, supra note 84, at 10–11 (2005) (contending that tribunal will
be judged by fairness of its trials and that Trial Chamber emphasizes fairness in allowing
self-representation).
88 For instance, Richard Goldstone, the ICTY’s first prosecutor, famously stated early
in the Tribunal’s history that the measure of its success would not be the number of convictions but rather “the fairness of the proceedings.” Mark S. Ellis, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV.
949, 949 (2003) (quoting Richard J. Goldstone, Address Before the Central and East
European Law Initiative [CEELI] Leadership Award Dinner (Oct. 2, 1996)); see also, e.g.,
Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.4, Dissenting Opinion of Judge David
Hunt on Admissibility of Evidence in Chief in the Form of Written Statements, ¶¶ 21–22
(Oct. 21, 2003) (Hunt, J., dissenting) (stating that tribunal will not be judged by number of
convictions or speed of proceedings but by fairness of trials); Theodor Meron, Procedural
Evolution at the ICTY, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 520, 524–25 (2004) (stating, as then-President
of ICTY, that courts must be procedural role models for human rights standards); Erik
Møse, Main Achievements of the ICTR, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 920, 933 (2005) (noting, as
then-President of the ICTR, that lengthy cases are necessary to dispel doubts about compliance with international standards of justice).
89 E.g., Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR 99-46-T, Judgment, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Dolenc, ¶ 5 (Feb. 25, 2004) (“[W]e cannot lose sight of the effect
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prudence have repeatedly been cited by scholars discussing human
rights in the context of domestic proceedings,90 by other international
courts and commissions and advocates before those bodies,91 and by
domestic courts interpreting their own international legal
obligations.92
Finally, I use the international criminal procedure context as an
example to illustrate a more general point about remedial deterrence
that may have important implications for other international courts.
Instances of remedial deterrence are generally difficult to document
of the Tribunal’s jurisprudence on international and national guarantees to a fair trial. If
the international tribunals fail to provide a model of fairness, we send the wrong message
to other courts.”); Judge Theodor Meron, President of the ICTY, Address to the United
Nations General Assembly (Nov. 15, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/
2004/p912-e.htm.
90 See, e.g., Rosemary Byrne, Assessing Testimonial Evidence in Asylum Proceedings:
Guiding Standards from the International Criminal Tribunals, 19 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 609,
609–10 (2008) (arguing that domestic asylum adjudication should borrow procedural and
evidentiary standards from ICTY and ICTR); Mark A. Drumbl, The Expressive Value of
Prosecuting and Punishing Terrorists: Hamdan, the Geneva Conventions, and International
Criminal Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1191–92 (2007) (criticizing military commissions for falling short of procedural standards established at international tribunals);
Guénaël Mettraux, Comparing the Comparable: 2006 Military Commissions vs. the ICTY,
5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 59, 61–66 (2006) (same); Matthew Bloom, Note, I Did Not Come
Here To Defend Myself: Responding to War on Terror Detainees’ Attempts to Dismiss
Counsel and Boycott the Trial, 117 YALE L.J. 70, 101–04 (2007) (citing, in discussion of
Guantanamo military commissions, international tribunal precedent on right to selfrepresentation).
91 E.g., Case C-397/03 P, Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Comm’n, Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano, ¶ 97 (June 7, 2005), available at http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/
form.pl?lang=EN (fill in “Names of parties” field and hit enter; then follow hyperlinked
case number to the left of “Opinion”) (citing ICTY on double jeopardy); Edwards v.
Bahamas, Case 12.067, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 48/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111, doc. 20
rev. ¶ 131 n.63 (2001) (citing ICTY and ICTR on sentencing procedure); Garza v. United
States, Case 12.243, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 52/01, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.111, doc. 20
rev. ¶ 56 (2001) (citing U.S. submissions referencing ICTY); Murray v. United Kingdom
[GC], App. No. 18731/91, 1996-I Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 42 (citing Amnesty International submissions referencing the ICTY).
92 See, e.g., Al-Moayad v. Germany, App. No. 35865/03, Decision, ¶ 20 (E.C.H.R. Feb.
20, 2007), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (for instructions on locating
documents within “HUDOC Database,” see supra note 24) (quoting, in translation, Federal Constitutional Court of Germany decision following the ICTY); MacCarthaigh v. Minister of Justice, [2002] I.E.H.C. 149 (14th May, 2002) (H. Ct.) (Ir.), available at http://www.
bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2002/149.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2008) (citing ICTY and ICTR
provision of simultaneous translation, though ultimately refusing to follow suit); A. v. Secretary of State, [2004] H.R.L.R. 38, ¶ 510 (A.C.) (U.K.) (Neuberger, L.J., dissenting)
(citing ICTY decision on exclusion of evidence); United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R.
283, 334 (Can.) (discussing inapplicability of death penalty in ICTY and ICTR); Mohamed
v. President of S. Afr. 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC) at 910 n.30 (S. Afr.) (discussing U.N. Security
Council’s decision to remove death penalty as option in ICTY); see also Michael P. Scharf,
The Iraqi High Tribunal: A Viable Experiment in International Justice?, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. J.
258, 259 (2007) (noting that procedures of Iraqi High Tribunal are modeled on those of
ICTY and ICTR).
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conclusively because courts do not candidly acknowledge them.93 But
one would expect that where remedial costs are especially high, remedial deterrence effects will be comparatively significant and easy to
identify. As U.S. constitutional scholar Daryl Levinson states, remedial deterrence “reflects simple economics”: If it is more costly to recognize a remedy, courts will be less likely to do so.94 International
criminal procedure provides a particularly good set of test cases for
evaluating the impact of high remedial costs in international courts
because in the ICTs, the available remedies are often extremely
costly.
In general, criminal procedure cases, particularly those cases
involving serious crimes, often produce especially thorny remedial
dilemmas. In such cases, monetary compensation is often inadequate
or inappropriate.95 Money may seem a particularly inadequate
remedy for a person facing a long prison sentence, and cash payments
to criminals or their families may be politically untenable. The ICTs
have granted financial compensation for a procedural violation only
once, awarding $2000 in the recent Rwamakuba case96—and the
Appeals Chamber made clear that this case, which involved a defendant who had been acquitted on all counts, was exceptional.97 Instead
of compensation, criminal courts usually turn to the other common
remedies for procedural violations, such as excluding evidence,98
reversing convictions, or dismissing charges.99 The ICTY and ICTR
(like some European courts) also sometimes grant sentence reductions on the basis of violations of a defendant’s pretrial rights.100
In the ICTs, the cost of these typical criminal procedure remedies
is essentially prohibitive because the ICTs face institutional con93 Fallon, supra note 57, at 660–61 (“[A]ssertions that particular doctrines reflect concerns about unacceptable remedies can not always be supported by rigourous proof.”);
Levinson, supra note 1, at 890 (“Individual examples of remedial deterrence are difficult to
document with great confidence . . . .”).
94 Levinson, supra note 1, at 889.
95 See Karlan, supra note 57, at 2004 (explaining that monetary compensation is rare in
U.S. criminal procedure cases).
96 Rwamakuba Remedy Appeal, supra note 31.
97 Rwamakuba Remedy Appeal, supra note 31, ¶¶ 27–30.
98 This Article does not focus on the cost of exclusionary rules because the ICTs (like
most domestic courts outside the United States) generally do not employ them, taking a
relatively flexible approach to the admission of most kinds of unlawfully obtained evi–
dence. See generally Prosecutor v. Brdanin,
Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on the Defense
“Objection to Intercept Evidence,” ¶¶ 32–55 (Oct. 3, 2003) (discussing use of exclusionary
rule in common law and civil law traditions and its application to international court
decisions).
99 Karlan, supra note 57, at 2004.
100 See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. Dismissals have been more politically
difficult. See infra notes 108–10 and accompanying text.
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straints that domestic criminal courts or other international courts do
not. Most importantly, after an appeal from conviction at trial at the
ICTs, retrial is all but impossible. Trials at the ICTs have cost $10.9
million per defendant,101 an extraordinary amount that the Tribunals
can hardly afford to spend twice. Scores of witnesses are flown in to
testify, an emotionally traumatic process that most would presumably
be loath to repeat.102 Moreover, the ICTs are temporary institutions,
currently required by U.N. Security Council resolutions to finish trials
by 2008 and appeals by 2010,103 although proceedings may in fact take
a year or two longer.104 Because proceedings typically last several
years, a retrial would almost surely require the Security Council and
General Assembly to authorize a significant extension of the tribunals’ mandates.105 Long delays may impair the Tribunals’ goals in
other ways, a point placed in sharp relief by the death of Slobodan
Milošević during his trial’s fifth year, widely considered a major setback to the ICTY.106 The ICTs are thus under pressure to complete
cases quickly, and this pressure shapes their procedural decisions.107
101 Starr, supra note 72, at 1276 n.97. I further suggest that the trial costs will rise to
$15.3 million per defendant in the next few years. Id.
102 See Sluiter, supra note 84, at 15 (2005) (reviewing reasons potential witnesses may be
reluctant to testify).
103 S.C. Res. 1534, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004); S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 7, U.N.
Doc. S/Res/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003).
104 See Letter of Fausto Pocar, President of the ICTY, to the President of the Security
Council, Annex I, ¶ 2, S/2007/663, (Nov. 12, 2007) (stating that ICTY trials are expected to
be completed by early 2010 and appeals by 2011).
105 The ICTs usually avoid expressly invoking their completion strategies in their procedural decisions. See Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.6, Decision on the
Interlocutory Appeal by the Amici Curiae Against the Trial Chamber Order Concerning
the Presentation and Preparation of the Defense Case, ¶¶ 17–18 (Jan. 20, 2004) (suggesting
that benefits of expediting trial for “convenience of the Tribunal” would be “inappropriate” consideration in procedural decisionmaking). One exception to this trend was the
ICTY’s decision in Prosecutor v. Prlić, where the court adopted specific measures to complete the presentation of cases in time. Case No. IT-04-74-T, Decision on Adoption of
New Measures To Bring the Trial to an End Within a Reasonable Time, ¶¶ 13–23 (Nov. 13,
2006).
106 See, e.g., David M. Crane, Terrorists, Warlords, and Thugs, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
505, 512 n.13 (2006) (“Time may also preclude a sense of justice, as seen recently in the
reaction to the death of Slobodan Milošević.”).
107 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Assignment of
Counsel, ¶ 16 (Aug. 21, 2006) (invoking completion strategy); Máximo Langer, The Rise of
Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 835, 886 (2005)
(describing effect of completion strategy); Michael P. Scharf & Ahran Kang, Errors and
Missteps: Key Lessons the Iraqi Special Tribunal Can Learn from the ICTY, ICTR, and
SCSL, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 911, 940–42 (2005) (describing ICTY reform of Rules of
Evidence to expedite witness testimony); Patricia M. Wald, To “Establish Incredible Events
by Credible Evidence”: The Use of Affidavit Evidence in Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal
Proceedings, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 535, 537 (2001) (describing movement toward use of
affidavit evidence because of right to prompt trial).
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Retrial in the face of this reality would be an extraordinary remedy
indeed.108
The main alternative to a retrial, releasing a suspected war criminal on a perceived technicality, is equally unappealing. This option
contravenes the Tribunals’ transitional justice objectives and is potentially politically disastrous. These stakes were made spectacularly
clear the single time the Appeals Chamber attempted to do so. In the
Barayagwiza case, early in the ICTR’s history, the Appeals Chamber
initially found that the defendant, an accused architect of the
Rwandan genocide, had been improperly detained for several months
and that the proper remedy was release and dismissal of the case with
prejudice.109 The Rwandan government reacted by threatening to cut
off all cooperation, a response that would effectively shut down the
Tribunal.110 In the face of this potential catastrophe, the Appeals
Chamber hastily invented a pretense to rehear the case (purported
“new facts”) and to alter its interpretation of the merits, allowing it to
reduce the remedy to a sentence reduction or (in the event of
acquittal) financial compensation.111
The Appeals Chamber’s legal contortions in the Barayagwiza
case are themselves examples of remedial deterrence. During the
review proceeding, the Appeals Chamber did not have the authority
to reconsider its remedial reasoning and began by “confirming its
[original decision] on the basis of the facts it was founded on,” emphasizing that its establishing Statute only permitted review on the basis
of “new facts.”112 To alter the remedy, it thus needed both to loosely
interpret the new-fact requirement—for which it has been roundly
criticized113—and to effectively narrow the underlying procedural
rights. For instance, in its initial decision, the Appeals Chamber had
held that (among other violations) Barayagwiza had been impermis108 Occasional dissents have argued for retrials. In Prosecutor v. Blagojević, the
majority found that the Trial Chamber did not err by requiring Blagojević to be examined
by his own counsel if he wished to testify in his defense. Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment,
¶¶ 26–29 (May 9, 2007). In his dissent, Judge Shahabuddeen disagreed, explaining that
Blagojević was “unlawfully prevented from telling his story” since the right to appear in
one’s own defense is central to the right to a fair trial. Id. ¶ 1 (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
109 See infra notes 114–16 and accompanying text.
110 ZAPPALÀ, supra note 56, at 256 (discussing political context of decision); Cogan,
supra note 84, at 134–35 (same); Fleming, supra note 84, at 142–44 (same).
111 Barayagwiza II Decision, supra note 42, ¶¶ 51–75.
112 Id. ¶ 51.
113 E.g., Drumbl & Gallant, supra note 70, at 652; William A. Schabas, International
Decisions, Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 563, 567–68 (Bernard H. Oxman
ed., 2000).
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sibly detained for eleven months without charge.114 It had held that
while a detainee need not be formally indicted immediately, he is entitled to be promptly “notified, in simple, non-technical language that
he can understand, [of] the essential legal and factual grounds for his
arrest, so as to be able, as he sees fit, to apply to a court to challenge
its lawfulness.”115
On review, the Appeals Chamber found that, in fact,
Barayagwiza had only been held without charge for eighteen days, not
eleven months.116 It relied on the Appellant’s statement at a hearing
on his eighteenth day of detention that he should not be extradited to
Rwanda because, as he put it, “[C]’est le tribunal international qui est
compétent.”117 On this basis alone, the Appeals Chamber concluded
“that it may accordingly be presumed that the Appellant was
informed of the nature of the crimes he was wanted for by the Prosecutor.”118 This is a remarkable non sequitur. Even if Barayagwiza
understood which court had sought jurisdiction over his case, that is a
far cry from being informed in clear language of the “essential legal
and factual grounds for his arrest”—that is, what conduct he was being
charged with.119 The Review Decision did not even attempt to
explain how the new evidence satisfied its earlier articulation of the
right. And although the Appeals Chamber succeeded in averting the
existential threat to the Tribunal posed by the Rwandan government’s
backlash, the Barayagwiza affair is generally seen today as a blemish
on the Tribunal’s history.120
The lesson of the Barayagwiza debacle appears to have been a
lasting one. Since then, neither the ICTR nor the ICTY has tried to
release a defendant on the basis of a procedural violation. This is
despite the fact that, although the ICTs’ trials have mostly been
praised as generally fair,121 a number of problems have drawn signifi114

Barayagwiza I Decision, supra note 31, ¶ 78.
Id. ¶ 82.
116 Barayagwiza II Decision, supra note 42, ¶¶ 54–55.
117 Id. (“It is the international tribunal that has jurisdiction.”) (translation by author).
118 Id.
119 See Schabas, supra note 113, at 569 (“Nothing in the record suggests that the ICTR
told [Barayagwiza] what the charges were on May 3 . . . .”).
120 See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 84, at 144 (“The catastrophic consequences of
Barayagwiza I were direct results of two distinct misapprehensions of the Appeals
Chamber’s role.”); Schabas, supra note 113, at 567 (“In the second decision, the appeals
chamber ultimately distorts the law in an effort to achieve the desired result . . . . [T]he
chamber’s efforts to justify overturning its previous decision are surprisingly weak.”).
121 E.g., David Wippman, The Costs of International Justice, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 861, 879
(2006) (“Although individual judgments have attracted criticism . . . most observers would
agree that the work of the Tribunal has generally been of high quality.”). But see Gregory
S. Gordon, Toward an International Criminal Procedure, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 635,
637 (2007) (criticizing various procedural problems, including lengthy pretrial detention).
115
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cant criticism on human rights grounds—long delays,122 lengthy pretrial detention,123 prosecutorial disclosure failures,124 other problems
with defense access to evidence,125 incompetent defense counsel,126
and significant resource disparities threatening the equality of arms.127
A few defendants have had convictions on particular charges vacated
on procedural grounds, but only when the effect on the total sentence
for all charges was relatively minor—no defendant has had all charges
dismissed on such grounds.128 Moreover, the ICTs’ shared Appeals
Chamber has never ordered a new trial of a convicted defendant on
procedural grounds.129 These results are consistent with what remedial deterrence theory would predict. The next three Sections use
case studies to show how the Tribunals have avoided these remedies—
by distorting doctrinal rules at other stages of the proceedings—and
build the causal case that these distortions result from remedial-cost
pressures.

122

See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
See Gordon, supra note 121, at 691 (“[Rule 65, governing pretrial release,] was for
many years extremely restrictive and placed on the accused the burden of showing ‘exceptional circumstances’ to justify release.”). See generally Daniel J. Rearick, Recent Developments, Innocent Until Alleged Guilty: Provisional Release at the ICTR, 44 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 577 (2003) (criticizing failure of ICTR to allow for provisional release).
124 E.g., Charmaine de los Reyes, Revisiting Disclosure Obligations at the ICTY and Its
Implications for the Rights of the Accused, 4 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 583, 592–93 (2005) (criticizing ICTR’s broad interpretation of witness statements and exculpatory material).
125 E.g., Cogan, supra note 84, at 121–27 (reviewing difficulties in gathering evidence or
forcing release of probative information); Gordon, supra note 121, at 676–80 (explaining
that statutory mechanisms allow state to avoid assisting defendants); Geert-Jan Alexander
Knoops, The Dichotomy Between Judicial Economy and Equality of Arms Within International and Internationalized Criminal Trials, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1566, 1587–89 (2005)
(arguing that defense teams lack access to exculpatory materials and witnesses).
126 E.g., David Tolbert, The ICTY and Defense Counsel, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 975, 975
(2003) (“[I]t is fair to say that the defense counsel and legal aid systems have been the
ICTY’s Achilles’ heel.”); Wippman, supra note 121, at 879–80 (“If the [ICTR] suffers from
a substantial weakness . . . it has been the variable, and sometimes very low, caliber of
some of the attorneys serving as defense counsel.”).
127 See Knoops, supra note 125, at 1566 (“Recent practice before the [ICTY] displays a
tension between the principle of equality of arms and that of judicial economy.”).
128 See infra notes 197–201 and accompanying text.
129 The Appeals Chamber has vacated one defendant’s guilty plea as insufficiently
informed, but this remedy was much less costly. Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-9622-A, Judgment, ¶ 20 (Oct. 7, 1997). Even if that defendant had been tried, it would have
been his first trial and would not have been perceived as duplicative or wasteful (especially
given that plea bargains are very unusual at the Tribunal). Moreover, a trial was an
unlikely consequence—the parties had already indicated their willingness to plea bargain,
and in fact, they quickly reached a new agreement. Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT96-22-Tbis, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 8 (Mar. 5, 1998).
123
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B. Remedial Deterrence Effects on Interpretation of Rights
Courts sometimes respond to remedial costs by substantively narrowing the definition of a right. These remedial deterrence effects are
well documented in national courts.130 Consider, for instance,
problems of racial discrimination. U.S. courts are required to reverse
criminal convictions in all cases involving racially discriminatory jury
selection.131 Pamela Karlan has demonstrated that the adoption of
this extreme remedy caused courts to narrow the circumstances under
which they will find such discrimination.132 Larry Tribe suggests that
the Supreme Court has refused to hold systematic racial discrimination in capital juries unconstitutional because there is no viable
remedy for it, “short of a radical overhaul in the structure of the criminal justice system, and perhaps in the structure of our society.”133 Bill
Stuntz has documented that the U.S. Supreme Court’s adoption of the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule resulted in limitations on the
underlying rights,134 while John Pottow has made a similar argument
about exclusion of evidence in Canada.135
Remedial deterrence effects appear to have substantially influenced the ICTs’ interpretations of defendants’ rights. A prime
example is the right to a speedy trial.136 At both the ICTY and the
ICTR, pretrial and trial proceedings typically last for several years,137
and pretrial release is either disfavored or (at the ICTR) nonexistent.138 Defendants have thus been subject to many years of detention
before and during trial, due to lengthy delays often triggered at least
130 Daryl Levinson has studied the phenomenon in particular depth. See Levinson,
supra note 1, at 889–99 (reviewing examples).
131 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986) (“If a trial court decides that the facts
establish, prima facie, purposeful discrimination and the prosecutor does not come forward
with an explanation for his action, our precedents require that Petitioner’s conviction be
overturned.”).
132 Karlan, supra note 57, at 2005, 2015.
133 Tribe, supra note 57, at 33–34.
134 See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV.
881, 917–18 (1991) (“[T]he exclusionary rule not only changes the rationale for having
warrants, it changes warrants’ constituency.”).
135 Pottow, supra note 58, at 64 & n.100 (citing other Canadian and U.S. literature on
remedial deterrence).
136 See, e.g., ICTY Statute, supra note 68, art. 21, § 4(c) (protecting right “to be tried
without undue delay”).
137 Rearick, supra note 123, at 577–79; Wald, supra note 107, at 535–36; Jenny S.
Martinez, Troubles at the Tribunal, WASH. POST, July 3, 2001, at A19 (“[T]he trials of even
low-level offenders are endless—two years from opening statement to verdict is not
unusual . . . .”).
138 See supra note 123 (noting ICTR chambers’ failure to grant provisional releases).
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in part by the prosecution’s requests for extensions of time.139 The
Tribunals have nonetheless consistently rejected claims of speedy trial
violations.140 In Rwamakuba, for instance, the defendant brought
such a challenge after he had been held in detention for seven years
prior to trial.141 The Trial Chamber explained that what counts as
“undue delay” turns on factors including the complexity of the case,
the seriousness of the charges, and the parties’ conduct.142 Similar
tests have been applied in other cases.143
Because ICT cases are all complex, and the charges serious, this
balancing calculus already tilts in the prosecution’s favor. The Trial
Chambers have furthermore been generous in accepting the prosecution’s reasons for delays. For example, in Rwamakuba, the Trial
Chamber accepted the prosecution’s explanation that it had experienced “difficulty in the investigatory process” and that the prosecution’s own decision to try Rwamakuba together with several codefendants had created logistical difficulties.144 Rwamakuba was ultimately tried and acquitted on all charges and released in September
2006, after more than eight years in detention.145 In September 2007,
the Appeals Chamber denied his request for compensation for this
prolonged detention, instead upholding the Trial Chamber’s $2000
award for a separate procedural violation relating to the initial
appointment of counsel.146 Other ICTY and ICTR cases have demonstrated similar patterns. In Bizimungu, the defendant Mugiraneza
had been detained for four and a half years; the Trial Chamber found
139 Gillian Higgins, Fair and Expeditious Pre-trial Proceedings, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
394, 394–95 (2007); Rearick, supra note 123, at 577–79.
140 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR 97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence,
¶¶ 582–84 (May 15, 2003) (involving seven-year detention of defendant); Prosecutor v.
Mugenzi, Case No. ICTR 99-50-I, Decision on Justin Mugenzi’s Motion for Stay of Proceedings or in the Alternative Provisional Release (Rule 65) and in Addition Severance
(Rule 82(B)), ¶¶ 12–13, 31–32 (Nov. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Mugenzi Decision] (addressing
situation in which defendant had been detained for over three years and trial had not yet
commenced).
141 Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR 98-44C-PT, Decision on Defense Motion
for Stay of Proceedings, ¶ 26 (June 3, 2005) [hereinafter Rwamakuba Motion Decision]
(noting that because reasonableness is judged on case-by-case basis, “a period of time of
more than seven years does not necessarily amount to an excessive delay in the
proceedings”).
142 Id.
143 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, Case No. ICTR 99-50-T, Decision on Prosper
Mugiraneza’s Application for Hearing or Other Relief on His Motion for Dismissal for
Violation of His Right to a Trial Without Undue Delay, ¶¶ 26, 30 (Nov. 3, 2004) [hereinafter Bizimungu Motion Decision]; Mugenzi Decision, supra note 140, ¶¶ 32–33.
144 Rwamakuba Motion Decision, supra note 141, ¶¶ 29, 33.
145 Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, Case No. ICTR 98-44C-T, Judgment, ch. IV (Sept. 20,
2006).
146 Rwamakuba Remedy Appeal, supra note 31, ¶¶ 13, 15, 23–30.
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that this was not an undue delay in light of the complexity of the case
and the lack of prosecutorial malfeasance.147 As of this writing three
years later, Mugiraneza remains in detention, his trial in progress.148
An ICTY Trial Chamber likewise rejected a speedy trial challenge in
the Nikolić case, although in that case, the defendant was convicted
“only” three years and eight months after his arrest.149
These outcomes are consistent with what remedial deterrence
theory would predict. The traditional remedy for speedy trial violations, endorsed by the Appeals Chamber in Barayagwiza, is release
and dismissal of charges.150 But that remedy, as the Barayagwiza case
ultimately illustrated, would be catastrophic for the ICTs. Thus,
whenever defendants, after a long delay, have complained of speedy
trial violations, the ICTs have construed that right narrowly and
avoided granting remedies.
It is possible that this narrow reading is simply correct and that
the ICTs would have adopted it regardless of the remedial cost. But
some contrary evidence is provided by the ICTs’ greater willingness to
enforce the speedy trial right when they consider its scope before a
potential violation, in contemplation of some procedural development
that would delay trial. For instance, in Muvunyi, the Trial Chamber
cited that right in denying the prosecution’s motion to amend the
indictment.151 In Rwamakuba itself, the Trial Chamber cited the
speedy trial right to support severance of Rwamakuba’s case from
147

Bizimungu Motion Decision, supra note 143, ¶¶ 31–33.
See ICTR, Case Minutes for Bizimungu, http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/
Bizimungu/minutes/index.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2008) (indicating recent developments).
149 Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶¶ 10, 270–71
(Dec. 18, 2003).
150 Barayagwiza I Decision, supra note 31, ¶¶ 104–08. This passage arguably consists of
dicta because Barayagwiza itself was not a speedy trial case—it involved delays in the
indictment and initial appearance rather than the trial. The ICTR has, in any event,
declined to find speedy trial violations even when defendants have merely sought provisional release as a remedy for long delays. E.g., Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Case No. ICTR
96-15-T, Decision on the Defense Motion for Provisional Release of the Accused, ¶¶ 8–12
(Feb. 21, 2001); Mugenzi Decision, supra note 140, ¶ 36. This is unsurprising, as even
provisional release is a prohibitive remedy in the ICTR because the Tribunal lacks the
capacity to enforce defendants’ return to trial and to protect witnesses. In the ICTY, in
contrast, provisional release is sometimes granted, and ICTY Trial Chambers generally
consider the length of detention as a factor influencing provisional release determinations.
E.g., Prosecutor v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-PT, Decision on Vidoje Blagojević’s
Application for Provisional Release, ¶ 58 (July 22, 2002).
151 Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR 2000-55A-PT, Decision on Prosecutor’s
Motion for Leave To File Amended Indictment, ¶¶ 48–50, 53–54 (Feb. 23, 2005); accord
Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, Case No. ICTR 99-50-AR5, Decision on Prosecutor’s Interlocutory Appeal Against Trial Chamber II Decision of 6 October 2003 Denying Leave to File
Amended Indictment, ¶¶ 16, 21 (Feb. 12, 2004).
148
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those of his co-defendants.152 Likewise, the ICTs have relied on the
right when denying motions to recall witnesses153 or to delay proceedings,154 when issuing scheduling orders,155 and when appointing pretrial and pre-appeal judges to expedite motions.156 Many of these
cases involve much shorter delays than those challenged in the ex post
assessment cases.
This disparity in treatment of the speedy trial right is also predictable: When there is less cost in interpreting the right broadly, as there
is when potential violations are considered ex ante, courts are more
likely to do so. Moreover, in such cases, defendants’ speedy trial concerns often align with the Tribunals’ institutional incentive to accelerate trials.157 Remedial deterrence effects may nonetheless spill over
into these cases to some degree: The legal tests adopted in high-cost
cases carry precedential weight in lower-cost cases. In many ex ante
assessment cases, the ICTs have rejected speedy trial arguments notwithstanding fairly long delays.158 Still, the Tribunals have some room
for maneuver in applying previously established legal tests to particular facts, and can sometimes recognize violations. All in all, although
the Tribunals’ conduct in ex ante assessment cases is inconsistent, they
have shown at least some willingness to interpret and apply the right
broadly, while they never do so when the speedy trial right is raised
after trial.
Finally, ICTs’ fears about enforcement difficulties can also influence rights interpretation. Such fears are likely when defendants
152 Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-PT, Decision on Severance of André
Rwamakuba and for Leave To File Amended Indictment, ¶ 31 (Feb. 14, 2005); accord
Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR 2000-55-I, Decision Regarding Prosecutor’s
Motion for Leave To Sever Indictment and for Directions on Trial of Tharcisse Muvunyi,
¶ 7 (Dec. 11, 2003); see also, e.g., Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-PT, Decision on
Prosecution Motion for Joinder, ¶¶ 47–52 (Nov. 10, 2005) (relying on speedy trial concerns
as basis for denying joinder motion).
153 E.g., Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Decision on Prosecution
Motion To Recall Witness Nyanjwa, ¶ 6 (Sept. 29, 2004).
154 E.g., Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR 98-41-T, Decision on Certification of
Interlocutory Appeal from Decisions on Severance and Scheduling of Witnesses, ¶ 10
(Sept. 11, 2003).
155 E.g., Prosecutor v. Milutinović, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Scheduling Order, ¶ 1 (Nov.
15, 2006).
156 E.g., Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Order Appointing Pre-appeal
Judge (Mar. 14, 2001).
157 See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text (noting that pressure to complete
cases quickly shapes procedural decisions).
–
158 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brdanin,
Case No. IT-99-36, Decision on Filing of Replies, ¶ 3
(June 7, 2001) (approving late amendment to indictment); Prosecutor v. Tolimir, Case No.
IT-04-80-AR73.1, Decision on Radivoje Miletić’s Interlocutory Appeal Against Trial
Chamber’s Decision on Joinder of Accused, ¶¶ 24–26 (Jan. 27, 2006) (denying challenge to
joinder).
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request orders against recalcitrant governments. The ICTs are dependent on state cooperation for many essential aspects of their operation.159 Tribunals may be cautious about issuing orders that are likely
to be disobeyed because noncompliance could undermine the Tribunal’s credibility and effectiveness. For instance, Jacob Cogan has
argued that fear of U.S. resistance shaped a recent ICTY order concerning defense access to evidence in U.S. possession.160 Such
instances are examples of remedial deterrence, as the high potential
cost of the remedial order—namely, the risk of noncompliance—discourages enforcement of the underlying right.161
C. Procedural Avoidance
Another way for courts to avoid granting undesirable remedies is
to find some procedural reason to avoid reaching the merits of a rights
claim in the first place. Such reasons could include a lack of jurisdiction over a complaint, a party’s waiver of an argument, or various justiciability or abstention doctrines. I refer to such strategies, which
consist essentially of what Bickel called the “passive virtues,”162 as
“procedural avoidance.” U.S. domestic law scholars have argued that
decisions about justiciability and jurisdiction often “represent concealed judgments on the merits,”163 and Dick Fallon has demonstrated
that they sometimes also represent concerns about remedies.164
In the ICTs—in contrast to the regional human rights courts, as
discussed in Part II.E below—there are generally no formal “admissibility” hurdles for defendants’ rights claims. Procedural avoidance,
nonetheless, is still occasionally a viable strategy. For instance, the
ICTs have held that they lack jurisdiction to review national authorities’ arrest methods and conditions of detention before transfer to Tribunal custody, even when the arrest and detention occur at the
Tribunal Prosecutor’s request.165 That rule has been criticized on
159

Wippman, supra note 121, at 876.
Jacob Katz Cogan, International Decisions, Prosecutor v. Milutinović, 101 AM. J.
INT’L L. 163, 167–69 (Daniel Bodansky ed., 2007).
161 See Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 57, at 54–55 (making similar argument in U.S.
context); Friedman, supra note 57, at 775 (same).
162 See infra notes 248–51 and accompanying text (discussing and critiquing Bickel’s
praise of these strategies).
163 Fallon, supra note 57, at 634–35; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or
Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1742–43 (1999) (arguing that standing is political, rather
than legal, determination and that “judges provide access to the courts to individuals who
seek to further the political and ideological agendas of judges”).
164 Fallon, supra note 57, at 635–37.
165 See Gordon, supra note 121, at 672–76 (discussing such cases in both ICTR and
ICTY).
160
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human rights grounds.166 But it has an obvious remedial-costavoidance advantage for the Tribunals, where the capture of suspects
often depends on the cooperation of states with poor human rights
records. If they were to assert jurisdiction to review arrest and detention methods, the Tribunals would probably be required to grant significant remedies (perhaps even release) in many cases.
Perhaps the most common procedural basis for dismissal of ICT
defendants’ human rights claims is the appellate waiver doctrine concerning arguments not raised at trial.167 The Appeals Chamber has
recognized exceptions to this doctrine, however, and applies it with
varying and sometimes unpredictable strictness,168 suggesting at least
the possibility that its application may vary based on remedial costs.
In Akayesu,169 for instance, the Appeals Chamber held that the defendant had waived his unlawful detention claim.170 This holding relied
on a stricter application of the waiver doctrine than the Appeals
Chamber had applied in other contexts,171 suggesting an ad hoc form
of remedial deterrence. As the Appeals Chamber acknowledged,
Akayesu had in fact filed a motion before the Trial Chamber arguing
that he was detained in Zambia without being properly charged.172
But the Appeals Chamber held that Akayesu had failed to argue specifically that the Office of the Prosecutor was responsible for that
failure.173
This hairsplitting is sharply inconsistent with the liberal approach
the Appeals Chamber has more often taken to the construction of
defendants’ submissions (many of which are poorly written).174 It
166

Id.
E.g., Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 337–41 (Nov. 16,
2001) (dismissing defendant’s appeal based on failure to raise procedural fairness issues at
trial).
168 See Drumbl & Gallant, supra note 70, at 631 (discussing inconsistency in waiver doctrine). Compare Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR 99-54A-A, Judgment, ¶ 21
(Sept. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Kamuhanda Judgment] (holding that in defective-indictment
cases, Appeals Chamber should ignore appellant’s failure to object below provided that he
proves prejudice), with Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1-A, Judgment,
¶¶ 91–96 (June 1, 2001) (failing to apply this exception in another defective-indictment
case).
169 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-A, Judgment (June 1, 2001) [hereinafter
Akayesu Judgment].
170 Id. ¶¶ 367, 372–75.
171 See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
172 Akayesu Judgment, supra note 169, ¶¶ 367, 372–75.
173 Id. ¶ 375.
174 Indeed, a far more lenient application of the waiver doctrine appears within the
Akayesu judgment itself. See id. ¶ 336 (holding that appellant could challenge ex parte
communication despite failure to raise it below because receipt of communication was
enough to put Trial Chamber on notice of potential objections); see also, e.g., Prosecutor v.
Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR 96-10-A, Judgment, ¶ 298 (Dec. 13, 2004) (stating that
167
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might be understood best as a response to the Barayagwiza debacle
less than a year earlier.175 Akayesu’s legal argument on appeal was
based on the Appeals Chamber’s original decision in Barayagwiza.176
That precedent might have required release if the Appeals Chamber
had found that Akayesu had similarly been detained impermissibly—
which is at least a possibility, as Akayesu was arrested by Zambian
officials several months before the ICTR issued an indictment against
him.177 And the Appeals Chamber, having barely managed to preserve the continued viability of the Tribunal via its forced retreat in
the Barayagwiza Review Decision,178 of course would have been anxious not to repeat that crisis. Again, while it is impossible to show
conclusively that remedial costs drove the Appeals Chamber’s application of the waiver doctrine, the circumstances are suggestive.
D. Remedial Deterrence at the Prejudice Assessment Stage
Like many countries’ domestic courts, international courts
decline to grant remedies for rights violations unless the victim shows
that she has been or will be harmed.179 As Dan Meltzer has commented in the U.S. context, such prejudice inquiries turn not only on
“the likelihood that an error affected the outcome, but also [on] how
great a likelihood the law should deem acceptable.”180 The subjective
nature of both the empirical and normative inquiries makes possible
another sort of remedial deterrence effect that, like procedural avoidance, does not require courts to narrow their substantive interpretations of rights: Courts can respond to high remedial costs by paring
back the circumstances in which they find prejudice.
A court may find that a human rights violation has taken place,
but set a high burden of proof of prejudice and find that the burden is
Appeals Chamber will consider all of defendant’s arguments, even when it is unclear
whether defendant is challenging Trial Chamber’s legal or factual findings); cf. Prosecutor
v. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Decision on Dragan Jokić’s Request To Amend Notice
of Appeal, ¶ 8 (Oct. 14, 2005) (holding that failure to clearly plead ground of appeal should
be forgiven “where that ground could be of substantial importance”).
175 See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text.
176 Akayesu Judgment, supra note 169, ¶ 354.
177 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 9–10 (Sept. 2, 1998);
see also Luc Côté, Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International
Criminal Law, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 162, 169 n.37 (2005) (describing Zambia’s arrest of
Akayesu following Security Council Resolution).
178 See supra notes 109–20 and accompanying text.
179 See, e.g., Erik G. Luna & Douglas J. Sylvester, Beyond Breard, 17 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 147, 178–79 (1999) (discussing standards for exclusion of evidence in European
countries); Edward A. Tomlinson, Nonadversarial Justice: The French Experience, 42 MD.
L. REV. 131, 175–76 (1983) (discussing harmless error review in France).
180 Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. CHI. L. REV.
1, 1 (1994).
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not met. This phenomenon is common in U.S. domestic courts, especially in criminal procedure cases, where the harmless error doctrine
provides courts of appeals with perhaps their strongest shield against
reversal of convictions.181 U.S. scholarship has shown that the harmless error doctrine is easy for judges to adjust so as to grant a desired
remedy or to avoid granting an undesired one.182 If similar discretion
exists in international courts, given the extraordinary costs associated
with appellate remedies at the ICTs, one would expect judges there to
impose particularly demanding prejudice requirements.
And indeed, they have done so: The ICTs’ shared Appeals
Chamber applies an exacting prejudice requirement to virtually every
kind of error related to trial procedure, even violations of defendants’
international human rights.183 In almost all such cases, the defendant
is required to prove “by clear evidence” that the error affected the
disposition in order to receive any appellate remedy.184 This requirement is even more demanding than the famously stringent harmless
error rule in U.S. courts, which requires the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that constitutional errors are harmless,
shifting the burden of proof to the defense only for errors not of constitutional magnitude.185 It also appears to be more demanding than
the approach of the European Court of Human Rights, which has held
181 See, e.g., Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV.
1, 7 (2002) (“[D]uring a ten year period, over ninety percent of death sentences imposed by
[California] trial courts were upheld on appeal even though nearly every case was found to
have been tainted by constitutional error.”).
182 E.g., id. at 62–72 (showing that in California, replacement of three anti–death penalty justices caused little change in rate of errors found in capital appeals but caused huge
increase in rate at which errors were found harmless).
183 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment, ¶ 21 (Nov. 30, 2006)
(describing standard of proof of prejudice for violations of right to fair trial); Prosecutor v.
Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 282, 295, 298, 303 (July 29, 2004) [hereinafter
Blaškić Judgment] (addressing disclosure violations); Akayesu Judgment, supra note 169,
¶¶ 340–41 (involving abuse of process).
184 Čelebići Case, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, ¶ 630 (Feb. 20, 2001) [hereinafter
Čelebići Case Judgment]. The most defendant-friendly standard that the Appeals
Chamber has endorsed—that the defendant must show “gross professional negligence
leading to a reasonable doubt as to whether a miscarriage of justice resulted”—appeared in
two early cases concerning ineffective assistance of counsel: Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No.
IT-95-1-A, Decision on Appellant’s Motion for the Extension of the Time-Limit and
Admission of Additional Evidence, ¶ 49 (Oct. 15, 1998), and Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
Akayesu Judgment, supra note 169, ¶ 78 (raising, but not answering, question of whether
extreme cases of negligence might require per se reversal). Under this standard, the
burden remains on the defendant, but he need only raise reasonable doubt. However, in
both of those cases, the Appeals Chamber found that no gross negligence was proven, so it
never applied the prejudice standard and does not appear to have invoked the standard
since.
185 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (discussing harmless error in context of admitting prejudicial evidence).
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that some categories of procedural errors require per se reversal.186
The Appeals Chamber has identified just one exception to this burden
of proof: An indictment defect is presumed prejudicial so long as the
defendant has properly objected to it at trial.187 But the prosecution
may rebut the presumption, and the Appeals Chamber has not
imposed a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for that rebuttal.
The Appeals Chamber also has not identified any trial-related188
errors requiring per se reversal of conviction.
The Appeals Chamber thus often refuses relief because the
defendant has failed to prove prejudice. For instance, in Krstić, the
Chamber found a raft of serious violations of the Prosecutor’s duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence but declined relief because prejudice
had not been proven.189 In the Čelebići Case the Appeals Chamber
chastised one of the trial judges for repeatedly falling asleep, stating
that “litigants are in general entitled to the full attention of the judges
who have to decide their case.”190 Yet it still held that the appellants
had failed to prove “by clear evidence” that judicial inattention had
resulted in prejudice.191 This decision was unusual only in that—perhaps because the incident had embarrassed the Tribunal—it discussed
the prejudice requirement at length. More often, the Appeals
Chamber simply asserts that prejudice must be shown192 or cites its
general standard of review, which requires that legal errors be shown
to “invalidat[e] the Trial Judgement.”193
I make no claim as to the merits of any of these specific prejudice
determinations. But it is fairly striking that the requirement to prove
prejudice is a barrier that no defendant alleging a fair trial violation
has ever overcome. The Tribunals’ dockets are relatively small, to be
sure, but not so small that this pattern can be ignored,194 particularly
186 See Artico v. Italy, App. No. 6694/74, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 35 (1980) (rejecting
prejudice requirement for violations of fair trial rights).
187 See infra notes 196–206 and accompanying text (discussing indictment defect cases).
188 Pretrial violations, in contrast, have not usually been subjected by the Appeals
Chamber to harmless error review—presumably, they could not be assessed for their
effects on trial outcomes under any standard because the harm they inflict is independent
of the trial itself. See supra notes 111–20 and accompanying text (discussing dismissal
remedy ordered in Barayagwiza). Nonetheless, some Trial Chambers have required a
showing that speedy trial violations have prejudiced trial fairness. E.g., Mugenzi Decision,
supra note 140, ¶¶ 12–13, 31–32.
189 Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 152–215 (Apr. 19, 2004).
190 Čelebići Case Judgment, supra note 184, ¶ 629.
191 Id. ¶¶ 630, 650.
192 E.g., Blaškić Judgment, supra note 183, ¶ 295.
193 E.g., Prosecutor v. Kordić, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Judgment, ¶ 119 (Dec. 17, 2004).
194 The ICTY, for instance, has completed proceedings with respect to 106 defendants as
of March 2008. See ICTY at a Glance: Key Figures of ICTY Cases, http://www.un.org/
icty/glance-e/index.htm (follow “Key Figures” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 25, 2008). If
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given the recurrent trial-fairness criticisms from human rights
advocates.195
Only in the indictment-defect cases, where the burden is shifted
to the prosecution, does the Appeals Chamber sometimes find prejudicial error. In these cases the remedial costs are lower because the
failure to properly plead particular incidents or legal theories generally does not result in reversal of conviction on even a single count;
rather, it results in partial vacatur of the findings of liability underlying a count. For instance, in Simić,196 the Appeals Chamber found
that the prosecution had failed to plead the joint criminal enterprise
theory on the persecutions count and that it had failed to overcome
the presumption of prejudice.197 But the Appeals Chamber simply
replaced the joint criminal enterprise conviction with a conviction for
aiding and abetting persecutions.198 In Muhimana,199 the Appeals
Chamber invalidated the finding that the defendant had committed a
particular killing, an allegation that had not been pleaded clearly, but
sustained his convictions on the basis of other conduct.200 In such
cases, the Appeals Chamber may reduce the sentence to account for
the reduced range of underlying criminal conduct, but only slightly: In
Simić, the sentence was reduced from seventeen to fifteen years, and
in Muhimana, the life sentence was affirmed.201
In Kupreškić,202 the Appeals Chamber did recognize a prejudicial
indictment defect that, in theory, could have had a much more substantial consequence, perhaps including retrial of two defendants.203
But that error proved irrelevant to the outcome because the Appeals
Chamber found that the evidence did not in any event support the
only because of the length and complexity of the trials, as well as the novelty of the justice
system in which they took place, one might expect these cases to have produced many
more serious procedural errors than would a typical sample of fifty-two trials in a reasonably well-functioning domestic justice system. ICT trials typically generate a large number
of procedural disputes. See ICTY Cases and Judgments, Indictments and Proceedings,
http://www.un.org/icty/cases-e/index-e.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2008) (listing interlocutory
decisions issued by each trial chamber).
195 See supra notes 121–27 and accompanying text.
196 Prosecutor v. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-A, Judgment (Nov. 28, 2006) [hereinafter
Simić Judgment].
197 Id. ¶¶ 73–74.
198 Id. ¶¶ 74, 233, 301.
199 Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR 95-1B-A, Judgment (May 21, 2007).
200 Id. ¶¶ 227–28.
201 Id. ¶ 228; Simić Judgment, supra note 196, ¶¶ 300–01 (explaining that this two-year
reduction in fact reflected combined remedy for indictment error and fact-finding error).
202 Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 113–14, 124–25
(Oct. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Kupreškić Appeal Judgment].
203 Id. ¶¶ 113–14, 124–25.
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convictions.204 The defendants were therefore acquitted on the merits
(a far more politically palatable result than release on a supposed
technicality205 and more practical than retrial), and thus no remedy
was necessary for the procedural violation.206 So Kupreškić represents, in essence, a zero-remedial-cost situation.
In sum, although it may be impossible to prove that any given
finding of no prejudice was caused by remedial deterrence, the overall
pattern of the Appeals Chamber’s decisionmaking at least suggests
that such deterrence is taking place. The Appeals Chamber occasionally finds prejudice in low-remedial-cost cases, but it uses a stringent
prejudice standard to avoid remedies in all other cases in which it recognizes rights violations.207
E. Remedial Deterrence in Other International Courts
To what extent can these observations about international criminal tribunals fairly be extrapolated to other international courts? As
discussed in Section A, the ICTs often face particularly high remedial
costs. If another international court has relatively low-cost, effective
remedies available, remedial deterrence effects will likely be mitigated. In addition, the ICTs may be especially likely to distort other
doctrines in response to the remedial costs posed by one particular
case because their temporary nature and relatively small dockets may
204

Id. ¶¶ 125, 245–46.
Although some political controversy has surrounded the few merits acquittals at the
Tribunals, e.g., Benoı̂t Henry, The Acquitted Accused, a Forgotten Party of the ICTR, 12
NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 81, 85 (2005), none has been comparable to the nearcatastrophic backlash that occurred in the Barayagwiza case, see supra notes 110–20 and
accompanying text. Indeed, occasional acquittals may actually help the Tribunals’ image
by suggesting that they are truly providing fair trials. E.g., Jacob A. Ramer, Hate by Association: Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability for Persecution, 7 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 31, 50 (2007); see also Mark S. Martins, National Forums for Punishing Offenses Against
International Law: Might U.S. Soldiers Have Their Day in the Same Court?, 36 VA. J. INT’L
L. 659, 678 (1996) (discussing Nuremberg Tribunals).
206 Kupreškić Appeal Judgment, supra note 202, ¶ 246 & pt. X.A. (disposition).
207 The Tribunals also have a line of jurisprudence barring cumulative convictions for
both greater and lesser included offenses. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-9623/1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 168–74 (June 12, 2002) (citing Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.
299, 304 (1932) and Čelebići Case Judgment, supra note 184, ¶¶ 412–13 (Feb. 20, 2001)).
This line might be characterized as involving the defendant’s procedural human rights, and
the Appeals Chamber has found that the improper entry of cumulative convictions itself
constitutes prejudice. Id. ¶ 169 (citing Čelebići Case Judgment, supra note 184, Separate
and Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt & Judge Mohamed Bennouna, ¶ 23). However, these cases involve extremely low-cost remedies as the sentence will still be based on
the same underlying conduct and the more serious of the two legal characterizations. The
Appeals Chamber thus rarely changes the sentence at all. See, e.g., Kamuhanda Judgment,
supra note 168, ¶¶ 77, 363 (affirming life sentence).
205
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make them less big-picture oriented than other courts.208 The ICTs
have finite dockets consisting of fewer than two hundred defendants
each, spread out over more than a decade. Every trial is high profile,
some extremely so. The Tribunals thus may not be able to afford to
issue high-cost remedies in one case to preserve a better doctrinal rule
for the long run. They may be forced to do whatever it takes to avoid
granting a catastrophic remedy in any single case, even if it means
distorting doctrines. In contrast, a permanent international court with
thousands of cases might be able to place greater weight on the long
term, absorbing high remedial costs in one case in order to avoid doctrinal spillover in other cases.
That said, there is no reason to think that remedial deterrence
does not have considerable relevance beyond the ICTs. After all, it
reflects basic economic rationality: The more costs a course of conduct imposes, the less likely any person or institution is to undertake
it. And all three of the strategies described above—procedural avoidance, narrowing of rights, and adjustment of prejudice requirements—
have also been documented in some form in U.S. domestic courts.209
They are all examples of a broader phenomenon that Richard Fallon
and Daryl Levinson have termed “equilibration.”210 As Fallon puts it,
judges seek “an acceptable overall alignment of doctrines . . . . When
facing an outcome or pattern of outcomes that it regards as practically
intolerable or disturbingly sub-optimal,” a court often finds it equally
easy “to reformulate applicable justiciability doctrine, substantive
doctrine, or remedial doctrine.”211
U.S. courts are part of a justice system encompassing vast numbers of cases each year, so we would expect them to be big-picture
oriented. They also face relatively few high-stakes, notorious cases,
and are much less vulnerable to political backlash of the sort that can
threaten the very existence of the ICTs.212 Thus, we would expect
remedial costs to be less extreme. Yet equilibration takes place there
as well—although perhaps often in a less drastic and more forwardlooking form than that which prevails at the ICTs. It may be more
oriented toward achieving, to use Fallon’s phrasing, an “acceptable
overall alignment of doctrines” that gets the right “pattern of out208 See David D. Caron, Towards a Political Theory of International Courts and Tribunals, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 401, 404–05 (2006) (arguing that courts with “open-ended
dockets” will pay more attention to precedent set in each case than courts with finite
dockets).
209 See supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text.
210 Fallon, supra note 57, at 637; Levinson, supra note 1, at 858.
211 Fallon, supra note 57, at 637.
212 See Caron, supra note 208, at 410 (discussing relative fragility of international courts
compared to most countries’ domestic courts).
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comes,” rather than being especially focused on the result of the particular case at hand.
Still, if remedial deterrence takes place in some form in systems
as disparate as U.S. courts and the ICTs, it seems likely that it will also
take place in other international courts. But the devil is in the details.
Predicting the extent of remedial-cost pressure in a particular case,
and the likely response, requires a detailed, court-specific inquiry such
as that made by this Article with respect to the ICTY and ICTR. A
number of questions might be relevant: What are the court’s major
institutional objectives? To which states or other constituencies is it
accountable, and what are their interests? What are the constraints on
its budget, time, and human resources? What remedial and enforcement powers does it have? How much flexibility does the court have
in manipulating remedial rules? Is it bound by codified rules, by its
own precedents, or by decisions of some higher court? Is the remedial
dilemma one that is likely to recur in other cases?
This kind of in-depth assessment of other international courts
beyond the ICTs exceeds this Article’s scope. But a quick perusal of a
few other courts’ case law suggests some of the range of variation.
Here, I focus mainly on the European and Inter-American Courts of
Human Rights (ECHR and IACHR, respectively), two supranational
courts that hear individual complaints against states for violation of
the respective regional human rights conventions.213 Remedial deterrence effects are harder to detect at the ECHR than at the ICTs,
probably because the remedies at the ECHR’s disposal are less costly.
The ECHR usually either remands cases to national authorities to
choose the remedy or grants relatively modest claims for financial
compensation, even in criminal procedure cases.214 And although the
ECHR has occasionally strongly suggested (without formally
ordering) that national authorities grant a retrial,215 that remedy is
less costly there than it would be in the ICTs—the defendants are not
213 American Convention, supra note 20, art. 63(1); European Convention, supra note
20, art. 45.
214 For instance, in speedy -trial cases, the European Court has usually been presented
with rather modest claims for financial compensation—and has been more willing to recognize violations than the ICTs have been. E.g., Pietilainen v. Finland, App. No. 35999/97,
Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), ¶¶ 45, 49 (E.C.H.R. Nov. 5, 2002), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (for instructions on locating documents within
“HUDOC Database,” see supra note 24); Eckle v. Germany, App. No. 8130/78, 51 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 96 (1982) (acknowledging claim for damages for excessive trial length but
finding claim unripe); see also TRECHSEL, supra note 78, at 134–49 (collecting cases).
215 See Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], App. No. 46221/99, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 210 (discussing other cases in which “retrial without delay” had been deemed “most appropriate
form of redress”).
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notorious war criminals convicted after long, expensive, and highprofile trials.
Moreover, in some cases, the ECHR has proven willing to narrow
the effective-remedy requirement itself, obviating the need to adjust
other doctrines. In Golder v. United Kingdom,216 the ECHR held that
mere declaratory relief sufficed as “adequate just satisfaction” for
non-pecuniary injuries, even when the claimant was seeking a remedy
for past injuries rather than a determination of continuing rights.217
The ECHR has since followed Golder a number of times, often over
vociferous dissents.218 Nonetheless, the majority of its case law follows the Chorzów Factory full-reparation formulation, and the Golder
exception has never been extended to pecuniary injuries.219
The IACHR does sometimes face significant remedial costs, particularly risks of state noncompliance.220 I would therefore expect to
see some degree of circumvention of these remedial costs. That circumvention, however, is unlikely to take the form of narrowing the
right at the merits stage. Most of the IACHR’s merits cases involve
alleged egregious violations of uncontroversial provisions of human
rights law, such as torture or extrajudicial killing. In such cases, it
216

App. No. 4451/70, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1975).
Id. ¶ 46 & Disposition.
218 E.g., Öcalan, ¶ 208 (“[A]ny damage the applicant may have sustained has been sufficiently compensated for by its findings of a violation of Articles 3 . . . , 5 and 6 of the
Convention.”); Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC], App. No. 31195/96, 1999-II Eur. Ct. H.R.
(partly dissenting opinion of Judge Bonello) [hereinafter Nikolova Dissent] (deeming it
“wholly inadequate and unacceptable that a court of justice should ‘satisfy’ the victim of a
breach of fundamental rights with a mere handout of legal idiom”); Marckx v. Belgium,
App. No. 6833/74, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 4–7 (1979) (joint dissenting opinion of six
judges) (arguing that compensation was supported in that case).
219 See supra Part I.A. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has a default rule
that for nonpecuniary injuries—“a judgment of condemnation may be, per se, a form of
compensation”—but it routinely departs from this default, citing the “grave circumstances”
of the case in question. The “Street Children” Case, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
77, at 39 (May 26, 2001). In Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, the ICJ
likewise limited the remedy for Serbia’s failure to prevent genocide to declaratory relief,
but only because causation has not been proven sufficiently to justify a damage award.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), Gen. List No. 91, at 165–66 (I.C.J. Feb. 26, 2007),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf. This causation finding could
well have been influenced by remedial costs, as a contrary finding could have exposed
Serbia to massive liability—and many Western states feared the political consequences of
that outcome. See Marlise Simons, Court Declares Bosnia Killings Were Genocide, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2007, at A1. In other cases, the ICJ has granted only declaratory relief
because that was what the complaining party requested. See Ian Brownlie, Remedies in the
International Court of Justice, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
557, 563 (Vaughn Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 1996).
220 Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93
CAL. L. REV. 1, 41–44 (2005).
217

\\server05\productn\N\NYU\83-3\NYU302.txt

734

unknown

Seq: 42

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

21-MAY-08

8:57

[Vol. 83:693

would be grossly inconsistent with the IACHR’s human rights promotion objectives to narrow the right to avoid reaching the conduct.
Instead, at both the IACHR and ECHR, procedural avoidance is
a likelier response to those remedial-cost pressures that do exist.
Unlike the ICTs, both courts have formal admissibility requirements
for claims. Until Protocol 11 of the European Convention went into
effect in 1998, a separate entity—the European Commission on
Human Rights—screened cases for the ECHR,221 and a similar process is still in place in the Inter-American system.222 In the European
system, over ninety percent of claims are dismissed at the admissibility
stage,223 and likewise in the Inter-American system, only a small fraction of petitions is ever decided on the merits.224
Scholars of both regional human rights systems have argued that
admissibility proceedings before their Commissions have essentially
served as proxy merits determinations.225 Indeed, both systems
explicitly incorporate some merits-linked criteria into their admissibility requirements: Complaints are deemed inadmissible if they are
“manifestly ill-founded” or are “incompatible” with the Convention
(that is, if they fail to state a legally valid claim).226 In applying those
criteria, the Commissions have had to resolve contested questions
concerning the interpretation of their respective Conventions.227
Even the less obviously merits-linked admissibility provisions—especially the exhaustion of local remedies requirement—have been
221 European Court of Human Rights, The Court: Historical Background, http://www.
echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/The+Court/The+Court/History+of+the+Court/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2008).
222 See Velásquez-Rodrı́guez Case, 1987 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 1, at 6 (June 26,
1987) (describing screening process).
223 See infra note 230 (providing statistics on dismissal rates).
224 James L. Cavallaro & Emily J. Schaffer, Less as More: Rethinking Supranational
Litigation of Economic and Social Rights in the Americas, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 217, 228–29
(2004).
225 E.g., TOM ZWART, THE ADMISSIBILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS PETITIONS 4, 140–54
(1994); Françoise J. Hampson, The Concept of an “Arguable Claim” Under Article 13 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, 39 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 891, 896–97 (1990);
Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 313 (1997).
226 European Convention, supra note 20, art. 27(2); accord American Convention, supra
note 20, art. 47 (similar wording for Inter-American Commission).
227 See Pinzas de Chung v. Peru, Petition 504/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 38/05,
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.124, doc. 5 ¶¶ 56–59 (2005) (refusing to decide case because claim did
“not tend to establish violations of the judicial guarantees protected by” American Convention); ZWART, supra note 225, at 140–41, 146–47 (describing examples where European
Commission declared cases inadmissible as failing to claim violations of rights guaranteed
by European Convention); Hampson, supra note 225, at 896–98 (discussing dispute
between European Court and European Commission over whether “manifestly illfounded” means “arguable”).
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applied in ways intertwined with the merits.228 And admissibility
determinations appear to have accommodated political constraints.
Tom Zwart has argued that the European Commission regularly
“rejected [petitions] at the admissibility stage because . . . [it] feared
that a decision on the merits might alienate (potential) States
parties.”229
Although scholars have not yet analyzed as comprehensively the
admissibility decisions of the ECHR after Protocol 11 phased out the
Commission, similar patterns seem to have prevailed. Dismissal rates
at the admissibility stage are no lower,230 and admissibility decisions
continue to involve merits-like considerations.231 Moreover, the
ECHR appears in at least a few cases to have used the admissibility
stage strategically to screen out politically explosive cases.232
228 The courts sometimes explicitly recognize this intertwining. E.g., VelásquezRodrı́guez Case, 1987 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 1, at 16–17 (June 26, 1987); Grieves
v. United Kingdom [GC], App. No. 57067/00, 2003-XII (extracts) Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 68. Both
courts tend to deem local remedies inadequate (waiving the exhaustion requirement) if the
nature of the alleged offenses and the surrounding circumstances demonstrate the government’s unwillingness to take its human rights enforcement obligations seriously. E.g.,
Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction), ¶¶ 151–61
(E.C.H.R. Feb. 24, 2005), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (for instructions on locating documents within “HUDOC Database,” see supra note 24); VelásquezRodrı́guez Case, 1988 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, at 13 (July 29, 1988); see Jo M.
Pasqualucci, Preliminary Objections Before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights:
Legitimate Issues and Illegitimate Tactics, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 26–29 (1999) (discussing
waiver of exhaustion requirements “in support of the defenseless victim”).
229 ZWART, supra note 225, at 4. For example, the complainant in Iversen v. Norway
challenged a mandatory public service requirement for dentists. 1963 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on
H.R. 278 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.). The Commission dismissed the complaint as “manifestly ill-founded”—a determination “influenced by political considerations.” ZWART,
supra note 225, at 5. The case had “caused considerable controversy in Norway,” and
Norway had just agreed to a one-year renewal of its accession to the Commission’s jurisdiction over individual petitions. Id. It thus had the option of dropping out of the regime in a
year’s time—and might well have done so had the court angered it. Id.
230 Compare Christina G. Hioureas, Behind the Scenes of Protocol No. 14: Politics in
Reforming the European Court of Human Rights, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 718, 718–19
(2006) (stating that in twenty-first century, court dismisses between ninety and ninety-six
percent of cases as inadmissible), with ZWART, supra note 225, at 5 (stating that Commission found 87.6% inadmissible in 1993).
231 For example, the court continues to deem “manifestly ill-founded” applications that,
while unmeritorious, are clearly not in its view frivolous. See, e.g., Al-Moayad v. Germany,
App. No. 35865/03, Decision, ¶¶ 62–72, 95–108 (E.C.H.R. Feb. 20, 2007), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (for instructions on locating documents within
“HUDOC Database,” see supra note 24) (expressing concern as to U.S. interrogation
methods, yet finding that “the assurance obtained by the German Government was such as
to avert the risk of the applicant’s being subjected to interrogation methods contrary to
Article 3 following his extradition”). .
232 For instance, in Al-Moayad, the court deemed inadmissible politically explosive challenges to Europe’s extradition of terror suspects to the United States. Id. Likewise, in
Banković v. Belgium, [GC], App. No. 52207/99, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 82, the court
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These cases do not necessarily involve remedial deterrence as
such. But when admissibility criteria can readily be manipulated in
response to merits-related concerns, they can also be manipulated in
response to their remedial concerns—a point Fallon has demonstrated
with respect to U.S. courts.233 The prevalent patterns in these courts
thus suggest that procedural avoidance would be a likely strategy in
cases posing high remedial costs. Adjustment of prejudice thresholds
is another possible strategy, but this may be incorporated into the
admissibility stage—both the ECHR and IACHR require a complainant to demonstrate that an alleged violation has caused injury
before proceeding to the merits.234
A wide variety of other kinds of international court proceedings—both in the human rights area and outside of it—might well
involve prohibitive remedial costs. For instance, the ICJ, which hears
disputes between states, often deals with politically explosive matters.
Accordingly, one would expect that remedial-cost pressures would be
high and that remedial deterrence might result.235 The same might be
said of bilateral boundary or claims commissions established after
armed conflict, where the cost of state anger about (or noncompliance
with) remedial orders might include the renewal of hostilities.236 All
of these questions are, again, beyond the scope of this Article. Howdeemed a challenge to NATO’s bombing of Kosovo inadmissible on jurisdictional grounds,
a decision that has been widely criticized. See Loukas Loucaides, Determining the ExtraTerritorial Effect of the European Convention: Facts, Jurisprudence, and the Bankovic
Case, 2006 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 391, 392–93 (citing critics); see also Barbara Miltner,
Broadening the Scope of Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on
Human Rights: An Expansion Under Isaak v Turkey, 2007 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 172,
176 (“It should be noted that this particular formulation of the principal exceptions to
territorial jurisdiction has not re-emerged since the Bankovic decision, suggesting that it
may not be representative of the Court’s position.”). The decision was issued three months
after September 11, 2001, and observers have speculated that it was motivated in part by a
desire not to constrict states’ responses to terrorism. Loucaides, supra, at 392–93.
233 See Fallon, supra note 57, at 635–37.
234 William J. Aceves, Actio Popularis? The Class Action in International Law, 2003 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 353, 384–85; Jacob D. Howley, Note, Unlocking the Fortress: Protocol No.
11 and the Birth of Collective Expulsion Jurisprudence in the Council of Europe System, 21
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 111, 113 (2006) (describing requirements of admissibility). In criminal
procedure cases, the European Court’s prejudice requirements are somewhat less exacting
than those imposed by the ICTs. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
235 One scholar recently documented another form of doctrinal equilibration at the
ICJ—namely, an interrelationship between the court’s admissibility decisions and its views
on the merits of cases. Alexander Orakhelashvili, Judicial Competence and Judicial Remedies in the Avena Case, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 31, 31 (2005).
236 See, e.g., New Eritrea-Ethiopia War Fears, BBC NEWS, Nov. 5, 2007, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/7078869.stm (stating that Boundary Commission deadline for border
demarcation “could end up being a trigger for war”); Michela Wrong, War Brews on the
New Frontier, NEW STATESMAN, Oct. 29, 2007, at 20–21 (arguing that example of “EritreaEthiopia debacle,” in which Ethiopia has refused to comply with Boundary Commission’s
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ever, advocates in these other contexts should at least consider the
possibility of remedial deterrence before pushing international courts
to adopt stronger remedial rules.
III
NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
International courts thus engage in a variety of doctrinal moves in
order to avoid granting remedies that impose unacceptable costs. But
are these moves normatively problematic, and if so, what should be
done about them? This Part explores these questions, arguing in Section A that although the doctrinal strategies described in Part II may
be defensible responses to serious institutional constraints, all of them
undermine human rights enforcement to some extent. The remainder
of Part III proposes possible solutions: Section B proposes institutional design changes to minimize remedial deterrence pressures,
while Section C argues for an interest-balancing approach to remedies
in international court cases that involve intolerable remedial costs.
A. Is Remedial Deterrence a Problem?
It is not immediately obvious that remedial deterrence in international courts, even if prevalent, should worry us. Indeed, some U.S.
scholars, like Owen Fiss, have affirmatively defended similar
processes:
[V]indication-at-any-cost is often thought to be one of the special
attributes of a right deemed ‘constitutional.’ . . . But for [most
rights,] the remedial costs are clearly relevant in determining
whether there is a violation. . . . [T]he court must not only consider
the harmfulness of the particular practice being challenged but also
whether it is sufficiently harmful to warrant the costs of eliminating
it.237

I agree that courts cannot ignore remedial costs, and I do not
claim that the ways in which international courts have accounted for
them are illegitimate per se. Indeed, as Daryl Levinson observes,
demarcation, will hamper “future attempts at peaceful arbitration” in other African border
disputes).
237 Fiss, Jurisprudence of Busing, supra note 57, at 195–96; see also Fallon, supra note
57, at 638 (“[C]ourts . . . should weigh concerns about the acceptability of remedies in
determining which substantive rights to recognize under particular provisions of law.”).
Friedman argues that when courts revise rights to accommodate popular resistance to remedies, they are permitting appropriate “majoritarian participation in defining rights.”
Friedman, supra note 57, at 777–78. This justification is harder to translate to the international context, since the relevant political resistance to international court decisions frequently comes not from any “majority” but rather from recalcitrant governments that are
sometimes entirely nondemocratic.
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remedial influence on rights interpretation is to some degree unavoidable, such that it would be nonsensical to contend that courts should
completely divorce rights doctrines from remedial considerations.238
All judicial remedies will impose some costs, and moreover, some
remedies may have benefits that encourage courts to broaden
rights.239 In one way or another, courts will always “peek ahead” to
the remedial stage.240 And perhaps they should. Courts cannot
decide rights claims in a vacuum; they must create workable law for
the real world.
But these realities do not mean that remedial deterrence is
always harmless, or that all forms and degrees of it are interchangeable.241 Part II outlined a particularly “extreme” dynamic: In many
ICT cases, exorbitant remedial costs essentially preclude recognition
of prejudicial rights violations, no matter how serious the challenged
conduct. In such cases, remedial deterrence pressures are likely to
distort other doctrines significantly and to undermine human rights
enforcement. Even if those distortions were the best available
responses to intolerable remedial costs, such consequences would still
justify looking for ways to reduce those costs.
1. Normative Premises
I begin with some basic normative assumptions. First, I start with
the basic belief that effective protection of the fundamental rights laid
out in the major human rights treaties is generally desirable. More
specifically, as discussed in Part II.A, I take for granted the impor238

Levinson, supra note 1, at 924.
Kamin’s study of harmless error in capital cases provides an example: Anti–death
penalty judges may lower the required prejudice threshold so as to enable them to vacate
the death sentence. Kamin, supra note 181, at 67–71.
240 Fallon, supra note 57, at 642.
241 Thus, I do not agree with Levinson’s conclusion that the inevitability of some doctrinal equilibration makes it “senseless” to look for particular subcategories of cases in
which rights interpretation is systematically slanted. See Levinson, supra note 1, at 894,
921. In the context of international human rights, I also resist his suggestion that because
of the deep intertwining of rights and remedies, rights should be understood as consisting
of nothing more than the remedy that a court will give if a particular harm is suffered. See
id. at 924. It would be strange to imagine human rights as consisting merely of the doctrinal rules that international courts adopt to enforce them. Not only is there no international system of binding precedent, but international human rights law has never been
primarily intended to be implemented by courts at all, much less international courts.
Rather, its core operation has been as a political instrument intended to shape state
behavior through persuasion, acculturation, and (mostly political) coercion mechanisms.
See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 625–27 (2004) (discussing these three types of
influence on state behavior).
239
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tance of protecting the procedural rights of criminal defendants, even
accused perpetrators of atrocities.
This general pro–human rights stance does not, however, translate into an automatic preference for broader rights interpretations or
stronger remedies for violations. Although most human rights
scholars today share certain core commitments, the more interesting
legal questions lie closer to the periphery—where to draw the boundaries of particular rights, and what to do when their protection conflicts with other important interests. Because this Article is principally
concerned with courts’ decisionmaking processes rather than with the
substance of any particular rule they have adopted, it generally
refrains from taking a normative stance on these more difficult issues.
In identifying remedial impacts on rights interpretation, I do not mean
to espouse any particular view of the correct interpretation of the
rights in question, in any abstract or absolute sense.242
Moreover, I believe that it is legitimate for judges to consider the
institutional objectives of, and constraints on, their courts when adjudicating individual rights claims. Indeed, in many instances it would
be irresponsible not to do so. By this, of course, I do not mean that
courts should be self-interested in a narrow sense—for example, concerned with institutional prestige for the sake of judges’ vanity. But
the international community creates courts to serve particular purposes, and those courts should be concerned with preserving the institutional capacity they need to accomplish them.243 In the case of the
ICTs, the courts’ purposes include important human rights concerns,
such as the interest of victims of atrocity in seeing justice done.
Defendants’ interests in broad rights and remedies cannot always
trump these competing considerations. And even if an ICT always
gave priority to defendants’ interests over those of victims, it still
would have to consider, in adjudicating each case, the long-run interests of defendants in other cases. I will develop these observations in
more detail in Section C.
2. Perverse Consequences and the Problem of Overkill
Taking these assumptions as starting points, I conclude that the
doctrinal strategies outlined in the previous Part, as responses to
242 See Levinson, supra note 1, at 921 (criticizing search for “some hypothetical ideal of
the ‘pure’ right”).
243 See Kingsley Chiedu Mogdalu, Image and Reality of War Crimes Justice: External
Perceptions of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF. 21, 22–23 (2002) (“[T]he effectiveness of international criminal tribunals as judicial
institutions depends largely on the cooperation of states because they do not possess the
automatic enforcement mechanisms of justice that are available to national jurisdictions.”).
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remedial costs, are all potentially normatively problematic for several
reasons. First, they subvert the victim-protective purpose of the effective-remedy requirement itself: The remedial rules that ICTs have
adopted to implement this requirement often perversely result in victims receiving no remedy at all. This effect is an “overkill” response
to excessive remedial costs, as it is worse for victims than some partial
remedy balancing victims’ interests with competing considerations.
Sometimes, these overkill effects may largely be confined to the
particular case in which high remedial costs are present. Courts
simply find a way to avoid recognizing a prejudicial rights violation on
the facts of the particular case, but they do not necessarily establish
precedents that they then follow consistently in other cases. For
instance, the ICTs may have manipulated the appellate waiver doctrine to avoid reaching rights claims in high-remedial-cost cases, while
liberally construing defendants’ trial submissions in cases not posing
such costs.244 Such ad hoc doctrinal manipulation amounts to arbitrariness in human rights enforcement, undermining the rule-of-law
norms that ICTs ostensibly seek to promote. The ICTs, like many
other international courts, generally seek to produce doctrine that will
help national authorities to identify and respect their own international legal obligations.245 But if the rules they adopt are inconsistent,
the message they send to those national authorities is unclear. And if
they manipulate facts to avoid applying the rules when they are inconvenient, the Tribunals risk sending the message that the rules need not
be taken seriously.
Sometimes, remedial deterrence effects play out in more “principled” ways: International courts adopt a narrow rights interpretation
or a strict admissibility or prejudice requirement in one case and then
consistently apply that rule in other cases. For instance, the ICTs have
applied the requirement that the defendant prove prejudice to virtually all kinds of procedural rights violations (except indictment
defects). But this kind of consistency itself may lead to overkill in a
second sense. Rather than simply dialing back the remedy in a particular case when that remedy is too costly, ICTs adopt doctrinal rules in
other areas of the law that have broad spillover effects on other cases
where those costs might not be present.
These two kinds of overkill effects suggest that an absolutist
approach to the right to an effective remedy may be self-defeating—it
undermines its own objective of making sure victims of rights viola244

See supra Part II.C (discussing manipulation of waiver doctrine).
See supra text accompanying note 89 (discussing objective of making ICTs into
models for other courts).
245
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tions receive remedies. A disturbing picture emerges from the various
patterns described in Part II. To a very significant degree, the ICTs
are institutionally incapacitated from ex post recognition of criminal
procedure violations that are serious enough to require a significant
remedy, such as release or retrial. In every sticky situation the tribunals have encountered, they have found some way out of doing so—
mostly through narrow definitions of pretrial rights and a strict
prejudice requirement that prevents relief for almost all trial-related
errors.
Despite these patterns, I do not doubt that the ICTs’ judges are
sincere in their commitment to the protection of defendants’ human
rights. The fair trial ideal suffuses the Tribunals’ case law and judges’
public statements.246 There is simply no reason to believe the judges
are biased against defendants; indeed, they are often criticized for
over-accommodating uncooperative defendants and for issuing light
sentences for serious crimes.247 But they are faced with institutional
constraints that they cannot ignore. They grapple seriously with hard
dilemmas and reach the best compromises they can. In doing so, they
are not acting lawlessly—they are simply acting like courts. After all,
remedial deterrence is also common in domestic courts; if it is more
striking in the ICTs, it is probably because of the extreme remedial
costs the Tribunals face.
3. Comparison of Different Forms of Doctrinal Equilibration
The ICTs’ doctrinal strategies to avoid remedial costs are not
interchangeable, and it is possible that some are normatively preferable to others.248 Procedural avoidance may seem less pernicious than
remedial deterrence at the merits stage, since it avoids distorting
rights interpretations. Indeed, Alexander Bickel famously argued in
favor of employing the “passive virtues” to avoid merits rulings that
endanger the court’s institutional health.249 Bickel’s argument has
been critiqued by other scholars, including Gerald Gunther, who
argued that manipulation of procedural doctrines is no more “passive”
246 See supra note 88 (citing prosecutors’ and judges’ statements on importance of fairness of proceedings).
247 See, e.g., Mark B. Harmon & Fergal Gaynor, Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary
Crimes, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 683, 683–86 (2007) (finding that ICTY has consistently
issued lenient sentences); Göran Sluiter, Compromising the Authority of International
Criminal Justice: How Vojislav Šešelj Runs His Trial, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 529, 533–35
(2007) (criticizing Appeal Chamber’s accommodating response to accused’s hunger strike).
248 See Fallon, supra note 57, at 638 (“[T]here should be no objection to allowing concerns about remedies to influence justiciability doctrines. But not all modes of influence
merit equal embrace.”).
249 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 132 (1962).
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than is a merits ruling.250 But assuming that Bickel was correct, that
procedural avoidance is a superior response to remedial costs, it
would still be better if the remedial costs themselves were reduced
such that courts were not forced to rely so heavily on the so-called
passive virtues. Procedural avoidance inarguably carries substantial
costs. The procedural barriers to invoking a right substantially affect
that right’s practical value.251 Erecting those barriers as a procedural
avoidance strategy may have spillover effects on the court’s enforcement of all rights. For instance, by holding that a pretrial rights claim
is outside its jurisdiction because the underlying police misconduct
occurred in another country, an ICT may be able to avoid remedial
costs without setting a bad precedent as to the rights interpretation.
But the jurisdictional rule itself sets a precedent.
Likewise, imposition of a strict prejudice requirement does not
technically narrow rights. Indeed, some U.S. scholars have argued
that the harmless error doctrine may affirmatively enable courts to
adopt broad interpretations of rights by reducing those interpretations’ remedial costs.252 But the resulting expansion of procedural
protections may not mean much to subsequent defendants if violations of those protections are consistently deemed harmless.253 In
other words, strict prejudice requirements reduce the “cash value” of
rights.254 If a right only entitles its holder to a remedy when he can
prove prejudice, it is worth less to him than if he does not bear that
250 Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive Virtues”—A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14, 19 (1964); see also Deborah
Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1107, 1149 (1995)
(“[A] decision-making principle that dismisses a case as unripe when the traditional understanding of the ripeness doctrine would clearly show it to be ripe is not passive.”).
251 Fallon, supra note 57, at 686.
252 Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 57, at 1799–1800 (arguing that as there is no Article III
requirement to rule on harmless error first, “there exists a substantial body of case law . . .
function[ing] more as a vehicle for the pronouncement of norms than for the resolution of
particular disputes”); Ted Sampsell-Jones, Reviving Saucier: Prospective Interpretations of
Criminal Laws, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 725, 766 (2007) (“Harmless error is another frequently used method of prospective rulings.”). But see John M.M. Greabe, Mirabile
Dictum!: The Case for “Unnecessary” Constitutional Rulings in Civil Rights Damages
Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 405 (1999) (arguing that harmless error doctrine
encourages “law-freezing” because court can “bypass the claim without deciding its
merits”).
253 See United States v. Pallais, 921 F.2d 684, 691–92 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.) (“The
expansive code of constitutional criminal procedure . . . is like the grapes of Tantalus, since
the equally expansive harmless error rule in most cases prevents a criminal defendant from
obtaining any benefit from the code.”); Kamin, supra note 181, at 6 (“[H]armless error . . .
has the capacity to make the separation of rights from remedies permanent.”).
254 Levinson, supra note 1, at 874, 887; see also id. at 904 (“At least since Legal Realism,
no one has missed the point that the value of a right is a function of the consequences that
will be brought to bear when the right is violated.”).
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burden. And if the right will be enforced in fewer circumstances,
potential violators will be less deterred.255 Thus, prejudice and admissibility doctrines do not provide cost-free responses to remedial deterrence pressures—instead, all of the doctrinal strategies discussed in
Part II risk substantially compromising human rights enforcement.
4. Judicial Subterfuge
International courts’ responses to remedial deterrence pressures
have often been inconsistent with the norm of judicial candor.256
Courts typically do not admit that they are changing a rights interpretation (or an admissibility or prejudice rule) in order to avoid a particular remedial consequence. Doing so might make them appear
unprincipled. So for the most part, remedial deterrence processes
occur sub rosa. For instance, it would have been almost unimaginable
for the ICTR Appeals Chamber to admit in the Barayagwiza Review
Decision that notwithstanding its earlier august declarations as to the
importance of protecting the defendant’s rights against detention
without charge, it was now rescinding that protection because of political pressure from Rwanda. Indeed, the Appeals Chamber actually
went out of its way to emphasize that this was not what it was doing—
even though few observers ultimately believed it.257
Candor is broadly understood to be central to the judicial function.258 Many commentators have made this case in detail, and so I
will only briefly sketch their main points. First, as David Shapiro
argues,
[The] requirement that judges give reasons for their decisions . . .
serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary’s exercise of
power. In the absence of an obligation of candor, this constraint
would be greatly diluted . . . . In a sense, candor is the sine qua non
of all other restraints on abuse of judicial power, for the limitations
imposed by constitutions, statutes, and precedents count for little if
255 See Pallais, 921 F.2d at 691–92 (stating that judicial admonitions do not effectively
deter unlawful prosecutorial comments to jury because prosecutors know that comments
are almost always deemed harmless).
256 Cf. Gunther, supra note 250, at 25 (“Bickel’s ‘virtues’ are ‘passive’ in name and
appearance only: a virulent variety of free-wheeling interventionism lies at the core of his
devices of restraint.”).
257 See supra note 111–120 and accompanying text.
258 See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 667–73 (“Candor and sincerity are part of the
distinctive process that legitimates judicial power . . . .”); Robert A. Leflar, Honest Judicial
Opinions, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 721, 721–23 (1979) (arguing for greater judicial honesty in
opinions); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 750
(1987) (“[T]he fidelity of judges to law can be fairly measured only if they believe what
they say in their opinions and orders, and thus a good case can be made that the obligation
to candor is absolute.”).
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judges feel free to believe one thing about them and to say
another.259

This argument has particular resonance in the context of ICTs,
which generally recognize an internationally protected “right to a reasoned opinion.”260 That right has little meaning if the court’s stated
reasoning is misleading.
Second, a “subterfuge that compromises an ideal without saying
so creates a risk that the ideal will be weakened, that people will come
to think that the ideal means only what has been imperfectly realized.”261 This may be especially true where the subterfuge takes the
form of remedial deterrence at the rights-interpretation stage. In such
cases, the court apparently endorses the redefinition of the right, and
since remedial costs are typically not even discussed, the reader has no
reason to call the redefinition into question. When a court announces
that no rights violation exists (rather than declaring itself unable to
remedy the violation), it serves to “legitimate [the challenged] actions,
and to relieve [other] actors of responsibility for solving these
problems in institutionally appropriate ways.”262
This problem may pose a particular danger to international
courts’ ability to contribute to human rights enforcement throughout
the world. International courts’ doctrinal rules are often shaped by
their specific institutional constraints and objectives, as Part II illustrated. But those rules take on a life beyond the institution. National
authorities (and other international courts) often look to international
judicial doctrine when determining their own human rights obligations.263 In determining what precedential weight to give that doctrine, they may well wish to consider the extent to which the rules
each international court has adopted are contingent on its particular
institutional concerns. When an international court has not been
candid about the reasons for its decisions, however, that task is much
more difficult. Judicial subterfuge—whether or not the product of
conscious dissembling264—may hinder international courts’ ability to
259 Shapiro, supra note 258, at 737; accord Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 667; Hellman, supra
note 250, at 1125.
260 E.g., Prosecutor v. Naletilić, Case No. IT-98-34-A, Judgment, ¶ 603 (May 3, 2006).
261 Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 673.
262 Tribe, supra note 57, at 33–34.
263 See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
264 In many instances, “subterfuge” is probably an overstatement, as international
judges are not really engaging in any deliberate deception. Remedial deterrence processes
may take place at a more subconscious level. Prohibitive remedial costs cannot help but
exert subtle pressure on judges’ decisionmaking at other stages of rights adjudication, even
if the judges do not think consciously about the ways in which their decisionmaking is
thereby altered. See Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296, 297–99 (1990)
(arguing that while deliberate deception cannot be defended, “non-introspection” is ethi-
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set clear and persuasive precedents for other actors in the international community, a goal that is among many of those courts’ stated
objectives.265
A number of scholars have advanced serious arguments against
an obligation of judicial candor.266 Some have argued, for instance,
that creative—i.e., misleading—readings of precedent enable courts to
contribute to the gradual evolution of the law.267 In some cases, it
may be more important for a court to appear principled than to be
principled; frankly admitting to ends-oriented decisionmaking might
unacceptably undercut the court’s legitimacy.268 Judge Guido
Calabresi has defended occasional use of subterfuge as arising in the
context of “tragic choices” and “hid[ing] a fundamental value conflict,
recognition of which would be too destructive for a particular society
to accept.”269 Even if we were to accept these arguments, however,
there would still be reason to worry about the existence of remedial
rules that systematically force courts to resort to less-than-candid reasoning. Few argue against candor as a norm in judicial decisionmaking,270 and nobody would dispute that it generally would be better
cally permissible); Martha L. Minow, Judging Inside Out, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 795, 798
(1990) (arguing that judges lack “easy access to language to describe the inner experience
of judging”). But remedial deterrence effects driven by this kind of self-deception, even if
ethically innocuous, still carry significant costs. Where they tip the balance, they matter to
the people whose rights thereby go unprotected. Moreover, even self-deception results in
opinions that conceal the real reasons driving court decisionmaking—a disservice both to
the parties and, in the case of international courts, to the development of international
legal doctrine.
265 See, e.g., Meron, supra note 89 (“Our judgments on both procedural and substantive
law now supply a foundation for all international criminal courts . . . .”).
266 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Bakke as Pseudo-Tragedy, 28 CATH. U. L. REV. 427, 429
(1979) (describing candor as “no less but no more significant a value than any of the other
ideals” that judges must take into account).
267 See Lon L. Fuller, The Law in Quest of Itself 12 (1940) (“Is [a judge’s] primary duty
one of fidelity to the existing law, or has he a more creative role?”).
268 See MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME COURT 27 (1964) (“It
would be fantastic indeed if the Supreme Court, in the name of sound scholarship, were to
disavow publicly the myth upon which its power rests.”); Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169, 236–41 (1968) (arguing that “the
Court’s symbolic role severely limits the applicability of any requirement of ‘candor’ in
measuring that institution’s achievements”). But see Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 671 (arguing
that “dishonesty always creates the risk of its detection, and, with detection, harm to the
courts’ stature”).
269 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 172–73 (1982);
accord GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 17–28 (1978) (discussing
difficulties in making decisions that will have societal consequences); see also Martha
Minow, Which Question? Which Lie? Reflections on the Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases,
1997 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23–30 (defending Supreme Court’s lack of candor about ubiquity of
physician-assisted suicide on similar grounds).
270 See Shapiro, supra note 258, at 738–39 (“I would surely be hard-put to identify
anyone who advocates deception across the board . . . .”); id. at 748 (“[S]ubterfuge can
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if judges did not face situations in which they feel required to lie. The
controversy is really about whether candor should be an absolute obligation, or whether strong competing interests can ever justify judicial
dissembling. My concern, however, is simply that international courts’
absolutist approach to the effective-remedy requirement creates too
many situations in which judges are faced with this ethical dilemma.
They cannot openly argue in favor of remedial shortfall; instead, they
must adjust some other doctrinal rule. Consequently, they must
choose whether to be honest about the reason for that adjustment or
instead to engage in subterfuge.
Perhaps the choices international courts have made in the face of
such dilemmas are, in fact, the right ones. Perhaps the various doctrinal choices described in Part II, even if they do result in underprotection of some human rights, are simply necessary evils—courts faced
with potentially catastrophic remedial costs cannot reasonably be
expected to choose to absorb those costs. To pick an extreme
example, few would contend that in the Barayagwiza review proceeding, the Appeals Chamber should have, at the cost of the complete breakdown of the Tribunal, stuck to its guns, freed the
defendant, and let Rwanda make good on its threat to cease cooperation.271 Nonetheless, it would still be better to minimize remedial
deterrence pressures by providing other ways for courts to avoid
untenable remedial costs without spillover effects on other doctrines.
In the next two Sections, I consider some possibilities for doing so.
B. Institutional Design Recommendations
When rights violations occur but remedial costs are prohibitive,
international courts are faced with intractable dilemmas. All of the
strategies described in Part II are damaging to human rights enforcement to some degree, as would be failure to provide an effective
remedy. The first thing to consider, then, is whether and how these
dilemmas can be prevented from arising by making effective remedies
available at lower cost. The prevalence of remedial deterrence effects
ought to influence the design of international courts and their procedural rules. Most obviously, the likelihood of such effects turns on the
remedial options at the court’s disposal. But many other institutional
design factors affect the costliness of remedies—for instance, the procedural posture in which rights disputes are typically presented to the
bring us peace only for a while; since we are ‘born to reason,’ honesty causes the tragic
choice to reappear.” (quoting CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 269, at 49)).
271 Even the harshest critics of the Barayagwiza debacle usually do not so contend;
instead, they criticize the Appeals Chamber’s initial decision as shortsighted. E.g.,
Fleming, supra note 84, at 144.
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court. This Section illustrates these points with specific recommendations related to the design of international criminal tribunals.
Although it is late in the day for the ICTY and ICTR, they remain
several years from closing their doors and still adopt amendments to
their rules of procedure several times each year.272 Moreover, most of
these recommendations are equally applicable to the permanent
International Criminal Court and any future ad hoc tribunals.
The most obvious and drastic remedy—release and dismissal of
charges with prejudice—will never be a tenable remedy for procedural violations in international criminal trials, except perhaps in truly
extraordinary cases. The charges are simply too serious. It will always
be politically disastrous to free a convicted major war criminal or
genocidaire, without the possibility of retrial, because of a procedural
mistake made by the tribunal or its prosecutor—and in many cases it
may be morally unacceptable as well. It would be perceived as a slap
in the face of victims, as it was in Barayagwiza, and would accordingly
be a blow to the Tribunal’s transitional justice objectives. Furthermore, it would be a windfall to the perpetrator of atrocities. Instead,
for serious pretrial violations, some remedy must be found that does
not result in impunity for the underlying crime.273 And for violations
undermining the fairness of the trial, reversal of convictions must be
followed by retrial, as is the usual procedure in domestic courts
around the world.274
This brings us to perhaps the most glaring problem driving remedial deterrence effects at the ICTs: the practical unavailability of
retrial as an appellate remedy. ICT procedure simply must be redesigned to make retrial a viable option. Retrial would be more feasible
if trials in general were shorter and less expensive, and so any design
proposal that improves both time efficiency and cost efficiency will
also tend to reduce remedial deterrence.275 Every proposal for
272 For a list of past and recent amendments to the Rules, see ICTY, Basic Legal Documents, http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/index.htm (in lefthand menu, follow “Rules of
Procedure and Evidence” hyperlink; then, in same menu, follow “Previous Versions”
hyperlink), and ICTR, Basic Legal Texts, http://69.94.11.53/default.htm (in lefthand menu,
follow “Basic Legal Texts” hyperlink; then follow “Rules of Procedure and Evidence”
hyperlink).
273 Part III.C., infra, discusses possible remedies for such violations from an interestbalancing perspective.
274 Cf. Stoichkov v. Bulgaria, App. No. 9808/02, Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction),
¶ 81 (E.C.H.R. Mar. 24, 2005), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/hudoc (for
instructions on locating documents within “HUDOC Database,” see supra note 24)
(noting that retrial is “most appropriate” remedy for significant criminal procedure
violations).
275 I will not focus here on the problem of lengthy and expensive trials generally, as that
issue has already been widely discussed. See supra note 137 (citing scholarship); see also
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improving this situation has its limits, though, so none would eliminate
remedial deterrence pressures entirely. The special character of these
trials guarantee such pressures—mass-scale crimes typically require
complex proof, delays are sometimes necessary to enable defendants
to prepare their defenses, and some special costs (like translation) are
inherent to the international setting.276
Beyond proposals for improving trials generally, however, there
may be other ways to expedite retrials. Presently, the ICTs’ Rules do
not provide for any special procedures for trials on remand,277 so presumably, such trials would be governed by the ordinary Rules. This is
a mistake. Within the strictures of the right to a fair trial, substantially
different procedures should be created for retrials. For instance, the
entire trial need not be repeated if parts of it were untainted by error.
Instead, the case could be remanded to the same Trial Chamber to
redo only the affected portions.278 Even if the whole trial were
tainted or otherwise had to be repeated in front of new judges, the
Tribunal could at least allow the parties to agree to admit some witnesses’ testimony in the form of videotapes or transcripts of the first
trial. Defendants might well agree to waive their procedural rights to
some extent, since they may prefer not to repeat (while in continued
preventive detention) a long ordeal of a trial.
Another barrier to retrials at the ad hoc ICTs is the Tribunals’
temporary nature, particularly the “expiration dates” imposed by their
completion strategies.279 That barrier, fortunately, will not be a
problem at the permanent International Criminal Court. But at the
ICTY and ICTR—and at any future temporary tribunals—it can and
should be removed. This is not to say that the Tribunals should be
made permanent. But there should be some procedure that allows for
retrial beyond the expiration date in the event of appellate recognition of procedural violations—either an exception to the completion

Eric Husketh, Note, Pole Pole: Hastening Justice at UNICTR, 3 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM.,
Spring 2005, available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/jihr/v3/8 (reviewing
efficiency problems and making several proposals).
276 See Wippman, supra note 121, at 880 (arguing that despite ICTY’s recent attempts to
cut costs, “there is an irreducible minimum that must be spent . . . if the quality of the
proceedings is to be maintained”).
277 Rule 117 simply states that “the Appeals Chamber may order that the accused be
retried according to law.” ICTY Rules, supra note 32, Rule 117.
278 Such an approach could work even if not all of the judges are available; the Tribunals
already permit substitution of one judge mid-trial. See ICTY Rules, supra note 32,
Rule 15 bis.
279 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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strategy or a referral to some standing international tribunal or
domestic court.280
Even if retrials remain implausible, other steps could be taken to
reduce remedial costs. Recall that the ICTs have been more willing to
protect the speedy trial right when presented with the issue prospectively than when asked to remedy a violation retrospectively. This
points to a general strategy: Design procedures so that courts can,
wherever possible, engage in ex ante enforcement of rights instead of
more costly ex post relief. Specifically, the ICTs should liberalize the
requirements for interlocutory appeals, allowing more rights interpretation to take place at an earlier stage with lower remedial costs.281
The ICTs’ Statutes do not provide for interlocutory review specifically; such review is established by the judge-created Rules of Procedure and Evidence.282 The interlocutory appeal procedure is quite
limited. The Appeals Chamber occasionally refers to it as “liberal,”
but that is only true in comparison to especially restrictive domestic
systems.283 Decisions on procedural motions are presumptively not
subject to interlocutory appeal (unless they pertain to jurisdiction),
and whether to depart from this presumption and certify an interlocutory appeal is within a Trial Chamber’s discretion.284 Trial Chambers
have denied certification even when it is evident that delay in appellate resolution could significantly prejudice the defendant. For
280 The ICTY already has a mechanism for referring defendants to domestic jurisdictions within the former Yugoslavia. Rule 11 bis, which applies “prior to the commencement of trial,” could be amended to extend to proceedings on remand. ICTY Rules, supra
note 32, Rule 11 bis. Rule 13 presumably would also have to be amended. That Rule
requires the President to request termination of any criminal proceedings instituted by “a
court of any State for a crime for which [the defendant] has already been tried by the
Tribunal.” Id. Rule 13. It is designed to address double jeopardy concerns, which should
be inapplicable where the new trial is the result of appellate correction of a procedural
error.
281 Allowing interlocutory appeals would not solve all remedial costs—sometimes, even
by the time of the interlocutory appeal, it is too late for an ex ante preventive approach.
That was the case in Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, which concerned the defendant’s initial
arrest and detention. Barayagwiza I Decision, supra note 31, ¶ 2. Nevertheless, interlocutory appeals can still minimize delays. Id. ¶ 72 (allowing interlocutory appeal because
judges saw “no purpose in denying the Appellant’s appeal, forcing him to undergo a
lengthy and costly trial, only to have him raise, once again, the very issues currently
pending before this Chamber”).
282 See Drumbl & Gallant, supra note 70, at 608–09, 613 (describing relationship of
Rules to Statute and discussing extent of interlocutory appeals allowed).
283 See Barayagwiza I Decision, supra note 31, ¶ 72 (accepting policy arguments in favor
of “liberal approach to admitting interlocutory appeals”). U.S. federal courts, for instance,
generally do not allow such appeals except in certain exceptional circumstances. See
Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 320–21 (1984) (discussing limitations on interlocutory appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000)).
284 ICTY Rules, supra note 32, Rule 72(B).
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instance, in Bizimungu, the Trial Chamber denied certification of
appeal from its denial of release on speedy trial grounds, even though
the magnitude of the purported violation would obviously have
increased by the time of eventual post-conviction appellate review. It
explained that Rule 73 “is clear with regard to the exceptional nature
of the [interlocutory appeal] procedure . . . . ‘This general rule is consistent with some important national jurisdictions around the world in
which interlocutory appeals are not allowed in criminal cases, or
allowed only in very limited circumstances.’”285
Commentators have sometimes cited efficiency concerns to justify limiting interlocutory review in the ICTs.286 This concern is valid;
interlocutory appeal cannot be permitted for every trivial issue. But if
interlocutory appeal proceedings were themselves made more efficient, the prospect of delays might not deter otherwise necessary certifications. The time limits for interlocutory appeals are expedited
relative to appeals from convictions, and one recent improvement has
been made: Permission to appeal need no longer first be granted by a
three-judge appellate bench.287 Still, the briefing of interlocutory
appeals often takes months because of translation-related delays,288
and the Appeals Chamber often takes several months to issue its decision after the briefs are filed.289
Understandably, the Appeals Chamber wants to take the time to
get its decisions right. Interlocutory appeals often set precedents on
important questions of first impression. But some of the delays go
beyond what is necessary. The briefing process could be accelerated
285 Prosecutor v. Bizimungu, Case No. ICTR 99-50-T, Decision on Prosper
Mugiraneza’s Motion for Leave To Appeal from the Trial Chamber’s Decision of 3
November 2004, ¶ 8 (Feb. 24, 2005) (quoting Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhoko, Case No.
ICTR 97-21-T, Decision on Ntahobali’s and Nyiramasuhuko’s Motions for Certification To
Appeal “Decision on Defence Urgent Motion to Declare Parts of Evidence of Witnesses
RV and QBZ Inadmissible,” ¶ 14 (Mar. 18, 2004)).
286 Cf. Fleming, supra note 84, at 115 (discussing importance of speed and warning that
appellate courts should not “interpos[e] appellate proceedings where they are not
warranted”).
287 Compare ICTY Rules, supra note 32, Rule 72 (current Rule not requiring approval
of three-judge bench), and ICTR Rules, supra note 32, Rule 72 (same), with ICTY Rules
of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 72(E), IT/32/Rev.34 (Feb. 11, 2005), available at http://
www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/index.htm (former Rule requiring approval of three-judge
bench), and ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 72(E) (June 7, 2005), available
at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/rules/070605/070605.pdf (same).
288 E.g., Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-AR116, Decision on Request
for Extension of Time, ¶¶ 1–4 (Jan. 27, 2006).
289 E.g., Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR 98-44-AR72.5, Decision on Jurisdictional Appeals: Joint Criminal Enterprise, ¶¶ 7, 9 & nn.16, 18 & 25 (Apr. 12, 2006)
(announcing decision nearly four months after filings); Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No.
IT-04-84-AR65.2, Decision on Lahi Brahimaj’s Interlocutory Appeal Against Trial
Chamber’s Decision Denying His Provisional Release, ¶¶ 1, 3 (Mar. 9, 2006) (same).
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by requiring the Tribunals’ registries to give more urgent priority to
the necessary translations or by requiring the prosecution (which is
expected to be competent in both of the Tribunals’ official languages)
to file its briefs in the defense counsel’s working language. Another
possibility is for the Appeals Chamber to announce its disposition of
the appeal as soon as the judges have decided on it, and only then take
time to refine its written reasoning.290
Even when violations cannot be identified until after a trial is
complete, judges (and designers of tribunals) should think creatively
about remedies short of a new trial that could allow them to be corrected. The Tribunals already have procedures for reopening trial
proceedings if necessary between the end of trial and the issuance of
the trial judgment.291 These procedures could perhaps be liberalized
further. The appeal process usually takes at least a year, sometimes
several. If procedural errors are discovered during that time, perhaps
the Trial Chamber could be permitted, at the Appeals Chamber’s
request, to hear new evidence on a particular issue and to modify its
judgment if necessary.
Alternatively, the Appeals Chamber could create a new basis for
admission of new evidence on appeal. Where its initial review of the
appeal briefs and trial record (in advance of the appeal hearing) suggests a likely procedural error, the Appeals Chamber could call for
new evidence to replace the portion of the trial infected by the error,
and draw its own factual conclusions based on the new evidence. The
Appeals Chamber in some cases already hears new evidence and
modifies the Trial Chamber’s findings of fact accordingly.292 The only
difference would be the conditions for admission of the new evidence.
These suggestions are not at all exhaustive—even as to the
ICTs—and obviously different procedures could be adopted by different international courts in response to their particular institutional
constraints. The general point is that if the designers of international
290 The Appeals Chamber has occasionally followed such a procedure with its merits
judgments. E.g., Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR 99-46-A, Judgment, ¶ 10 (July 7,
2006).
291 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 9 (July 21,
2000) (describing Trial Chamber’s order reopening proceedings); Prosecutor v. Stakić,
Case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 183–93 (Mar. 22, 2006) (citing Furundzija in support
of proposition that reopening trials, not mistrial, was appropriate remedy).
292 See ICTY Rules, supra note 32, Rule 115; ICTR Rules, supra note 32, Rule 115.
Most new evidence is introduced upon one of the parties’ request, and the moving party
must meet Rule 115’s fairly strict conditions. The Appeals Chamber occasionally requests
new evidence proprio motu, however, relying on its Rule 98 authority. See e.g., Prosecutor
v. Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-A, Judgment (Reasons), ¶ 63 (July 3, 2002) (“The
Trial Chamber does, however, have a clear power . . . to direct the Prosecution to obtain
material which may be relevant to the case of the accused.”).
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courts are concerned with effective human rights enforcement, an
important prerogative should be the creation of low-cost but effective
remedial mechanisms for rights violations. For the most part, all this
will take is a little creativity and the flexibility to change procedural
rules if a court’s initial experience demonstrates serious remedial
deterrence effects.
C. Remedial Interest Balancing
Creative institutional design will not prevent all remedial
dilemmas from arising, even in the best of circumstances. And international judges are not faced with the best of circumstances. Rather,
they often face serious remedial costs that require hard choices. What
should a court do when an “effective” remedy for a rights violation
would pose unacceptable costs? Must it always grant the remedy? If
not, should it openly confront the necessity of remedial shortfall, or
should it find some other way to avoid the remedial question? This
Section argues for a candid interest-balancing approach to remedies
for human rights violations in international courts. That approach
would give heavy weight to the victim’s interest in receiving an effective remedy for rights violations, but courts would be permitted to
choose lesser remedies (or in some cases, no remedy) in the face of
sufficiently compelling countervailing considerations.
1. Background on Remedial Interest Balancing
In an influential 1983 article, U.S. constitutional scholar Paul
Gewirtz outlined the differences between “rights-maximizing” and
“interest-balancing” approaches to constitutional remedies. Following
Gewirtz, the distinction is between pure plaintiff-centered approaches
and broader, policy-oriented interest balancing. Under the rightsmaximizing approach,
[T]he only question a court asks once it finds a violation is which
remedy will be the most effective for the victims. . . . The costs of
alternative remedies are therefore irrelevant except when such costs
actually interfere with a remedy’s effectiveness, or when the alternatives are equally effective and a criterion other than maximum
effectiveness must be the basis for selection.293

Remedial shortfall might occasionally be justified under such an
approach,294 perhaps because full remedies are literally impossible,
because multiple remedial goals conflict,295 or because a lesser remedy
293
294
295

Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 591; see supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 589–92, 597.
Id. at 593–96.
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may for some reason ultimately be more effective for victims.296 But
it cannot be justified on the basis of competing interests other than
those of the plaintiffs themselves.
In contrast, an interest-balancing approach would permit courts
to justify remedial shortfall based on other interests beyond those of
the plaintiffs. As Gewirtz describes it: “[R]emedial effectiveness for
victims is only one of the factors in choosing a remedy; other social
interests are also relevant and may justify some sacrifice of achievable
remedial effectiveness. . . . Interest Balancing thus tolerates a gap
between right and remedy that could be closed.”297
As Fallon and Meltzer argue, “the interest in individual
redress . . . must occasionally yield to other factors.”298 For instance,
Gewirtz points out that desegregation remedies can impose costs on
“innocent” third parties—for instance, children of all races for whom
busing will mean much longer rides to school.299 Gewirtz argues that
such interests, at least, “cannot be totally ignored.”300 Both Owen
Fiss and Kent Roach have also argued for approaches to remedies that
permit some interest balancing.301
Can an analogous interest-balancing approach to remedies be justified in the international context? As discussed in Part I, international courts’ approaches to human rights remedies are presently
rights-maximizing. Criteria other than effectiveness may be relevant,
but only with respect to the question of which form of full reparation
to require (e.g., compensation or restitution302) or, in the ICTs’ case,
as a justification for more-than-full windfall remedies. Given the
prevalence of remedial deterrence effects, however, this rights296 For instance, in school desegregation cases, Gewirtz argues that rights-maximizing
courts could justifiably take white resistance into account—not to accommodate racist
preferences but rather to protect plaintiffs from the consequences of a social backlash
against unpopular remedies like busing. Id. at 609. Thus a court could decide that the
plaintiffs would be best served by some lesser remedy—e.g., slowed phase-in of desegregation or a less ambitious numerical objective for integration rates. Id. at 614–15, 635–42.
297 Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 591, 599.
298 Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 57, at 1791; see id. at 1793 (discussing factors militating
for modified remedies in case of new rules); see also Meltzer, supra note 57, at 2559–60
(asserting that presumption in favor of “individually effective redress . . . can be outweighed by practical imperatives”).
299 Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 600 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1971)).
300 Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 593.
301 Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 57, at 48–49 (discussing “other values” that “should
be considered” in crafting remedies); Roach, supra note 57, at 859–64 (supporting “equity”
approaches to remedies because of their flexibility and because they allow for interest
balancing).
302 See, e.g., ILC Articles, supra note 11, arts. 35–37 (discussing criteria for requiring
remedies of restitution, compensation, and satisfaction).
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maximizing approach is self-defeating. Instead, some degree of
interest balancing is necessary.
The proposal I set forth below is similar in many ways to those of
the U.S. scholars mentioned thus far in this Section, but some qualification is necessary. With the exception of Fallon and Meltzer, who
offer a broader “theory of constitutional remedies,”303 the scholars
cited above all tailor their arguments to prospective injunctive relief in
contemporary public law litigation, principally class actions,304 a setting in which U.S. courts have often used interest-balancing
approaches.305 They do not apply those arguments to compensation
for past injuries or to individual claims for prospective relief, much
less to the procedural rights of individual criminal defendants. And
few other U.S. scholars have argued for an interest-balancing
approach to remedies in those other settings,306 even though courts
may sometimes use such an approach in practice.307
By “public law litigation”308 (also known as “structural
reform”309 or “institutional”310 litigation), I mean lawsuits intended to
303 Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 57, at 1777. Fallon and Meltzer’s theory reaches both
civil damages and criminal procedure remedies. Id. at 1787–91, 1808–20. But their main
focus is on the retroactive application of “new law,” a particularly important source of
right-remedy gaps in U.S. constitutional law, but less so in the ICT setting. Thus, they do
not explore in detail the specific implications of their theory in broader contexts.
304 Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 57, at 48 (discussing various remedies, all of which
are injunctions); Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 587–88 (“The problems of remedial limitation
considered here involve a particular remedial instrument, the modern injunction.”); Roach,
supra note 57, at 861–62 (focusing discussion of remedies on injunctions).
305 Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 642.
306 Some criminal procedure scholars have argued for interest balancing in the specific
context of exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence. E.g., Gregory D. Totten et al., The
Exclusionary Rule: Fix It But Fix It Right, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 887, 913–14 (1999); see also
Friedman, supra note 57, at 741–43 (discussing interest-balancing argument in context of
damage remedies); cf. Robert S. Stevens, A Plea for the Extension of Equitable Principles
and Remedies, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 351, 385 (1956) (advocating incorporation of equitable
balancing into courts of law).
307 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 57, at 1765 & n.191 (citing examples of interest
balancing in contract remedies). In addition to express interest balancing on a case-by-case
basis, various U.S. doctrines that affect plaintiffs seeking legal remedies (such as immunities) create right-remedy gaps, and those gaps are justified on the basis of competing interests. Id. at 1780–86; Friedman, supra note 57, at 746 (discussing right-remedy gap created
by Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence). Adoption of similar doctrines
could theoretically reduce remedial costs in the international context, at least in suits for
damages. But because such doctrines would apply in all cases and not just in cases in which
remedial costs are particularly high, they might also amount to overkill responses to excessive remedial costs. See supra Part III.A.2. See generally Daniel J. Meltzer, Member State
Liability in Europe and the United States, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 39 (2006) (comparing
European Court of Justice and U.S. approaches to immunities).
308 See Chayes, supra note 57, at 1284 (coining this phrase).
309 E.g., Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 57, at 1–5 (giving overview of history of structural reform litigation).
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achieve broad-based institutional reform rather than simply to make a
particular defendant whole. Remedial shortfall is easier to justify in
this context because of the very purpose of public law remedies. U.S.
constitutional remedies were once principally modeled on a private
law tradition311 in which the scope of a remedy flowed directly from
the right—essentially, the Chorzów Factory approach. As Abram
Chayes has written, the advent of public law litigation fundamentally
transformed this model.312 Remedies in such cases often center on
injunctive relief, an equitable remedy previously considered
“extraordinary.”313 Under the modern approach, remedies are discretionary policy choices rather than findings “derived logically from the
substantive wrong adjudged. . . . In both the liability and remedial
phases, the relevant inquiry is largely the same: How can the policies
of a public law best be served in a concrete case?”314
As the desegregation cases show, sometimes those policies may
be best served by “second-best” remedies. In class actions, remedial
shortfall may be inevitable, because class members’ interests may conflict such that some members may have to receive an incomplete
remedy in order to serve the best interests of the class as a whole.315
Moreover, interest balancing is relatively easy to justify when remedies involve broad structural reform, because such reforms profoundly
and obviously affect innocent third parties whose interests are thus
310

Fletcher, supra note 57, at 635; Shane, supra note 57, at 554.
I do not mean to imply that private law remedies have always been so straightforward as this “traditional” approach would suggest. See, e.g., DAVID I. LEVINE ET AL.,
REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 8–9 (1996) (arguing that both private and public law
remedies involve range of discretionary choices); Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C.
Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV.
465, 481–86 (1980) (pointing out that “supervisory burdens” often imposed by remedies in
public law litigation are akin to phenomena in traditional private law). The literature on
private law remedies is broad-ranging and complex, and largely beyond the scope of this
Article; some of the constitutional scholarship on which I draw in turn relies on insights
initially developed in a private law context. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 1, at 857–60
(applying insights from relationship of rights to remedies in private law to constitutional
arena). Still, it is clear that while deviations abound, the dominant remedial approach in
the U.S. private law tradition is still for courts to seek to make the victim whole for his
injuries. E.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 15–16 (3d ed. 2002)
(describing “rightful position” standard—returning plaintiff to position she “would have
been in but for the wrong”—as “essence of compensatory damages”).
312 Chayes, supra note 57, at 1296–97.
313 Id.
314 Id.; see also Fiss, Forms of Justice, supra note 57, at 47 (criticizing rights-maximizing
principle for assuming that remedies can be derived logically and exclusively from violations); Fletcher, supra note 57, at 640 (arguing that courts in institutional suits cannot
simply “provide a determinate and easily administered remedy”); Shane, supra note 57, at
554–55 (“Typically, the relief involved [in public law litigation] is intended to be corrective,
not strictly compensatory.”).
315 E.g., Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 606 & n.50, 620.
311
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difficult to ignore. An interest-balancing approach is also a natural fit
where the relief sought is an injunction, since injunctions are based in
an equity tradition that has always required such balancing.316
Some human rights litigation in international courts falls roughly
within the above-described public law model. In particular, the remedial jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has
often emphasized institutional reform. While individual victims’ families, rather than larger classes, have usually brought claims,317 these
claims often involve a background of mass abuses, and the Court has
been creative and fairly aggressive in designing injunctive relief to
prevent repetition of such abuses. In cases involving individual
murders or disappearances, for instance, it has ordered the creation of
a nationwide genetic databank to identify missing persons,318 broad
human rights education programs for the armed forces and police,319 a
comprehensive system of judicial records covering all government
detainees,320 and a new legislative provision criminalizing enforced
disappearance.321 In such cases, an interest-balancing approach would
require the Court, in deciding whether to order such broad remedies,
to consider the various costs of implementation. The IACHR has not
engaged in such interest balancing expressly, although it may be doing
so implicitly and simply concluding that the remedies are worth the
costs.
2. Interest Balancing in the ICT Setting
In contrast, the ICTs do not deal with public law litigation but
rather with individual rights claims that arise in the criminal process.
In this context, the case for interest balancing is more complicated.
Can the extreme cost of remedying criminal procedure violations in a
316

Id. at 603; Roach, supra note 57, at 862.
A few international claims tribunals have developed special mass-claims procedures,
although such tribunals generally only have the power to order compensation (or, sometimes, restitution of real property) and not institutional reform. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Recognition of Victims’ Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203, 240–41 & 240 n.199
(2006) (discussing U.N. Compensation Commission); John R. Crook, Thoughts on Mass
Claims Processes, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 80, 80–83 (2005) (giving overview of international claims tribunals).
318 Case of Molina-Theissen v. Guatemala, 2004 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 108, at
43–44 (July 3, 2004).
319 Myrna Mack Chang Case, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101, at 130 (Nov. 25,
2003).
320 Juan Humberto Sanchez Case, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 99, at 93
(June 7, 2003).
321 Trujillo Oroza Case, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 92, at 33–35 (Feb. 27,
2002).
317
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particular case ever justify departure from the remedy the Tribunal
would otherwise deem “effective”?
Such shortfall would be hard to justify under a rights-maximizing
approach, which would consider only the interests of the specific
defendant whose rights have been violated. Consider the costliest
remedies available to the Tribunals for procedural violation: release
or retrial. Granting one of those remedies may undermine the Tribunals’ objectives in a number of ways and may even ultimately harm
defendants in other cases, but the defendant in the initial case receives
a windfall. Of course, Part II showed that in practice, a requirement
to provide such windfall remedies often actually harms defendants
because the ICTs have found alternate strategies to avoid granting
remedies entirely. But a rights-maximizing court could not defend
this justification for departing from the rule, since the obvious
rejoinder is that the court should simply reject those circumvention
strategies as well.
Under an interest-balancing approach, however, the ICTs could
take into account a whole new range of remedial costs—for instance,
the affront to atrocity victims caused by the release of accused or even
convicted perpetrators on procedural grounds perceived as technicalities. Such costs might also include likely future remedial deterrence
effects and their consequences for future defendants. When adopting
a particular remedial rule in one case, the court could consider the
remedial costs that this precedent will impose in other cases. Such an
approach might make remedies in the ICTs look more like remedies
in class-action litigation, with remedial deterrence effects on other
defendants treated something like the consequences of resistance to
desegregation remedies. In both situations, a remedy that vindicates
one claimant’s rights may cause spillover effects that make it harder to
vindicate the same rights for other members of the class.
But can an interest-balancing approach to remedies for criminal
procedure violations be justified? It is easy to see the potential for
abuse. Suppose a convicted defendant shows that he has suffered a
procedural violation absent which he would not have been convicted.
At a gut level, at least, it seems indefensible for the court to say, in
effect, “Sorry, we know you have not been convicted based on a fair
trial, but it would be politically disastrous to release you, so tough
luck—you get no remedy.” But consider instead the case in which a
defendant has been detained unlawfully for several weeks before
being charged, arraigned, and assigned counsel. After that initial
period, the defendant’s procedural rights are respected; he receives a
fair trial, is convicted of overseeing the genocidal massacre of hundreds of thousands, and is sentenced to life in prison. In determining
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what remedy to grant for the pretrial procedural violation—e.g.,
release and dismissal of the indictment, or a sentence reduction—is
the Appeals Chamber limited to considering only the defendant’s
interests? Must it entirely exclude from consideration both the magnitude of the defendant’s crime and the interest of the victims and
international community in punishing that crime, such that the
remedy for a few weeks’ unlawful detention is the same for a
genocidaire as it would have been for a common thief?
In the latter situation, loosely parallel to that in Barayagwiza,322
it is much easier to see the justification for interest balancing—and
that balance might well tip against a remedy of dismissal and even
against a significant sentence reduction. Essentially, two international
wrongs have occurred—the defendant’s crime and his unlawful detention—and the Tribunal has only one kind of currency for responding
to both of them, namely the defendant’s liberty.323 It can punish the
crime by depriving the defendant of his liberty, and it can remedy the
procedural violation by restoring some or all of that liberty. But in
the hypothetical, the two wrongs are not on the same order of magnitude. So canceling the defendant’s punishment for the crime, in whole
or in significant part, seems wildly incommensurate, putting a few
weeks’ ill treatment of one person on the same plane as the slaughter
of hundreds of thousands.
Of course, perhaps the rationale for these strong remedial rules
has never turned on the violation’s being “as bad as the crime.”
Rather, it may be about restraining the abuse of power.324 We tolerate the occasional windfall to the major criminal because vigorous
protection of defendants’ rights may deter the police from rounding
up whomever they want and holding them for weeks at a time. Even
so, however, there is certainly room for such deterrence rationales in
an interest-balancing calculus. Indeed, consideration of broader ruleof-law objectives probably fits better in an interest-balancing
approach than in a Chorzów Factory–type rights-maximizing
approach, as it is not about making the defendant whole for his own
sake. An interest-balancing court could sometimes grant more-thanfull remedies on the basis of deterrence or expressive rationales.325
322 See supra Part II.A. Two differences are that in Barayagwiza, the matter reached
the Appeals Chamber in an interlocutory posture, and the countervailing interests included
potentially catastrophic political consequences.
323 See supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text (discussing unavailability or inappropriateness of financial remedies in most ICT cases).
324 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 57, at 1787–89 (arguing that most “unyielding”
purpose of U.S. constitutional remedies is to check governmental abuses).
325 Cf. Roach, supra note 57, at 862–63 (arguing in U.S. context that equity should support expansive remedies).
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For instance, in a case of egregious abuse of process, an ICT could
determine that even after taking into account all the countervailing
interests, the windfall remedy of release with prejudice is necessary to
send the message to the prosecution that such conduct will not be
tolerated.
More generally, an interest-balancing court need not simply
weigh the relative magnitudes of the rights violation and the crime.
Rather, it could—and should—give a heavy presumption in favor of
remedying rights violations, and depart from that norm only when
very strong countervailing considerations are present. As Gewirtz
argues in the domestic context, “the social benefit of the right and the
interest in undoing effects of its violation must be given exceptional
weight in the balance; otherwise the . . . allocation of rights would be
subject to a de novo utilitarian reevaluation in particular cases.”326
In some cases, however, interest balancing would result in curtailment of remedies. For instance, suppose the Appeals Chamber concludes that a defendant has been convicted of genocide after a fair
trial, but that before that trial, he faced many years’ delay in violation
of his speedy trial rights. Under the ICTs’ current remedial doctrine,
he would be entitled to dismissal of the charges with prejudice and
release. But an interest-balancing approach might deem this remedy
unacceptable and either deny relief entirely or grant some lesser
remedy, such as a sentence reduction. This shortfall may make some
human rights advocates uncomfortable. But if we accept an interestbalancing approach to remedies for other serious human rights violations, there is nothing so sacrosanct about criminal defendants’ rights
that would make such analysis categorically inappropriate.
Interest balancing, moreover, is inherent to criminal procedure—
even if it has been largely excluded from the remedial stage.327 The
“reasonable doubt” standard, for instance, strikes a balance that errs
on the side of avoiding wrongful conviction but does not require certainty. And routinely, defendants’ rights—e.g., the rights to bail,
appointed counsel, and “equality of arms”—are limited in ways that
accommodate the public’s legitimate interest in punishing and deter-

326 Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 607; accord id. at 602 (“Interest Balancing must be used
with great caution to assure that the right receives sufficient weight in the balance.”).
327 Indeed, interest balancing is inherent to human rights adjudication generally. Likewise, competing interests and institutional constraints naturally affect other aspects of
international courts’ operation, beyond human rights adjudication—for instance, the ICTs’
interpretations of substantive international criminal law and their prosecutors’ charging
decisions. Cf. Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 676 (noting that “adaptive strategies and compromises with practicalities . . . pervade all aspects of law”).
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ring crime as well as other interests, such as keeping the justice system
operating at reasonable expense.328
Harmless error review, too, is a kind of interest-balancing
approach—one that permits right-remedy gaps.329 If we only cared
about ensuring that every rights violation was remedied, we would
reverse automatically for every violation. Indeed, we would do so
even if we only cared about ensuring that every prejudicial violation
was remedied; because it is not always easy to identify and prove
prejudice, sometimes errors that were in fact prejudicial will survive
harmless error review.330 The ICTs’ current approach to prejudice
assessment, in which the defendant almost always bears that burden,
makes mistakes even more likely. It can only be justified by a calculus
that gives considerable weight to the international community’s
interest in finality of convictions. Indeed, the ICTs’ standard gives too
little weight to defendants’ rights, especially because of its spillover
effects—in response to high remedial costs in some cases, it places
nearly insurmountable burdens on all defendants.
If we accept this kind of interest balancing in defining rights and
assessing prejudice, it becomes difficult to justify excluding it entirely
at the remedial stage. Of course, it might be argued that because competing interests are already balanced at earlier stages, they need not
be reconsidered at the remedial stage.331 But some costs are truly
remedial in nature—that is, they are not inherent in the nature of the
right but instead depend on what remedies the court chooses to vindicate that right. Remedial costs also may differ from case to case,
depending on the procedural posture and factual circumstances. Such
costs can be taken into account at earlier stages in the proceedings.
Indeed, Part II demonstrated that ICTs often do so. But if it were
possible for courts instead to balance those costs at the remedial stage,
they would not need to take them into account earlier. Therefore, the
court could avoid the twin overkill problems prevalent in courts’
responses to remedial deterrence pressures: total, rather than partial,
328 See Eugene Cerruti, Through the Looking Glass at the Brady Doctrine, 94 KY. L.J.
211, 242 (2005) (discussing interest balancing in context of prosecutorial disclosure); Anne
Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection from Successive Prosecution: A Proposed
Approach, 92 GEO. L.J. 1183, 1252 & n.373 (2004) (discussing interest balancing in context
of double jeopardy, confrontation, compulsory process, and search and seizure); Stephen
F. Smith, The Rehnquist Court and Criminal Procedure, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1337, 1350
(2002) (“[I]nterest-balancing takes center stage in criminal procedure . . . .”).
329 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 57, at 1771–73 (arguing that harmless error is determined by balancing risk of prejudice against burden of retrial).
330 See id. at 1772–73 (arguing that “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard does not
require certainty of no risk for prejudicial error).
331 See Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 603 (responding to this objection).
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deprivation of remedies332 and undesirable spillover effects on cases
not presenting the same remedial costs.333
Why, then, does interest balancing seem so inappropriate in the
first hypothetical I gave, in which the unfairly tried war crimes defendant is imprisoned to avoid undesirable political consequences? The
problem is not the use of interest balancing but rather the inclusion of
illegitimate interests in the balance. Gewirtz argues for an interestbalancing approach that would exclude all interests that conflict with
the very nature of the right in question. For instance, in a desegregation case, the interests of white racists in maintaining segregation
cannot count in the calculus.334 A similar analysis could be applied
readily to the criminal procedure context. If the right to a fair trial
means anything, it is that the state (or international community)
cannot have a legitimate interest in punishing an accused who has not
been fairly convicted, no matter how serious the accusations.
Perhaps one could differentiate an interest in avoiding political
backlash (and its consequences for the court’s legitimate objectives)
from an interest in punishing unproven accusations, even if the potential backlash would itself be motivated by such illegitimate interests.
But even if consideration of such an interest were deemed legitimate—a position I am reluctant to endorse—it would take extraordinary circumstances for an ICT to justify accommodating political
resistance to the implementation of the fair trial right. Not only
should that right itself weigh heavily in the interest-balancing calculus,
but political backlash is often a speculative risk, and accommodating it
may backfire. An ICT would not have much credibility left if it
admitted to convicting a person without a fair trial; as discussed
above, the fair trial norm is central to the effective implementation of
the ICTs’ transitional justice goals.
The interest-balancing approach probably would alter the ICTs’
remedial analysis only when the rights violation has caused the defendant harm that does not impair the fairness of the trial. This category
encompasses the serious violations most prevalent at the ICTs—
namely, most pretrial violations, including speedy trial problems as
well as unlawful arrests and initial detention. ICTs are especially vulnerable to these kinds of claims because of the length of their proceedings and the fact that they must often coordinate arrests with
states that have poor human rights records.335 Interest balancing
332 See id. at 606 (arguing that if injunctive relief is too costly, other remedies may still
be available to courts).
333 See supra Part III.A.
334 Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 606–07.
335 See supra notes 137, 165–66 and accompanying text.
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might also affect remedies for other non-outcome-linked violations,
like those challenging the conditions of detention. But for rights
claims related to the fairness of the trial, interest balancing is not
likely to change remedial outcomes, and so its availability will not
reduce remedial deterrence pressures. For those kinds of violations,
the only viable strategy for reducing those effects is to develop lowercost remedial options, as discussed above in Section B.
This interest-balancing approach would bear little resemblance to
the strategy, taken by the European Court in Golder v. United
Kingdom,336 of simply defining down full or effective remedies to
include merely declaratory relief for past injuries.337 Under the
interest-balancing approach, the court that chooses a second-best
remedy would have to acknowledge candidly the remedial shortfall
and justify it on the basis of strong, legitimate competing interests.
The Golder approach, in contrast, fails to justify or even acknowledge
any remedial shortfall. Rather, it claims to grant an effective remedy
while in fact granting no remedy at all.338 The practical difference
between the two approaches lies in the legal consequences for other
cases. Golder sets the precedent that a judgment of condemnation
amounts to full reparation for all nonpecuniary damages (no matter
how severe) caused by human rights abuses, even absent some special
competing interest. And indeed, several national courts in Europe
have followed that precedent.339
In contrast, a candid approach to interest balancing will avoid
leading other actors—like the European domestic courts that have
followed Golder—to mistake a partial or nonexistent remedy for a full
or effective one. As Gewirtz has argued, “[b]y candidly acknowledging that they are providing something less than a full remedy,
courts leave the unfulfilled right as a beacon. This leaves open the
possibility that at some point the courts themselves will be able to
336 App. No. 4451/70, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 46 (1975); see supra notes 216–17 and
accompanying text.
337 I do not intend to suggest that declaratory relief has no proper role to play in human
rights litigation; it may be an important tool for clarifying states’ continuing legal obligations and conceivably could facilitate and expedite subsequent domestic litigation over
remedies. Cf. EDWIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, at xiii–xvi (2d ed. 1941)
(discussing declaratory judgments in domestic courts). But to suggest that a declaratory
judgment itself amounts to a sufficient remedy for injuries caused by past rights violations
is, at least, a significant departure from the full remedy rule.
338 Cf. Roach, supra note 57, at 894 (“Equity . . . unmasks the judicial choices that
corrective justice so easily hides. Instead of findings of no causal responsibility, equity
forces judges to confront their discretion not to award remedies.”).
339 Nikolova Dissent, supra note 218 (“Except for those courts that now rely on the
Golder incantation, I am not aware of any national court settling for a mere finding of
breaches of rights as a substitute for a specific remedy . . . .”).
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furnish a more complete remedy,” or that other actors will do so.340
That approach is especially attractive in the context of human rights
law, which has an important aspirational component.341 International
courts’ human rights rhetoric may help to shape international norms
even when their actual enforcement of those rights falls short.342
3. International Legal Foundations
An interest-balancing approach to remedies in human rights
cases would represent a fairly substantial departure from the Chorzów
Factory full remedy rule and, more generally, from the rightsmaximizing approach that has dominated international courts’ remedial decisionmaking. It would not, however, be completely without an
international law foundation. Departures from the full remedy rule
have already been accepted by some courts in expropriation cases,
replaced with a concept of “just compensation” that strikes a balance
between the property owner’s rights and the state’s policy interests.343
And in cases involving mass human rights abuses, states and international tribunals have often issued less-than-full remedies.344 Scholars
have defended those remedies on the basis that it would be impossible
to provide full reparation to all of the victims; impossibility is a builtin exception to the full remedy rule under Chorzów Factory.345 But in
mass-abuse situations, “impossibility” is often a legal fiction. In most
such cases, it would not really be impossible to compensate all victims
340 Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 673; see also Tribe, supra note 57, at 29 (“Even in the
extreme case of remedial impotence, what a court says and does can shape the political
dialogue in profound ways.”). For these reasons, I do not embrace Friedman’s suggestion
that “where the court’s very ability to compensate is uncertain, it is fair to ask whether a
declaratory judgment . . . is not remedy enough.” Friedman, supra note 57, at 743. At the
very least, the court should admit that it is not remedy enough but, due to extraordinary
countervailing interests, is the only remedy available.
341 See, e.g., Philip Harvey, Aspirational Law, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 701, 717–19 (2004)
(arguing human rights law’s aspirational status is necessary for eventual enforcement);
Deena R. Hurwitz, Lawyering for Justice and the Inevitability of Human Rights Clinics, 28
YALE J. INT’L L. 505, 512 (2003) (asserting that human rights law has “intrinsic aim of
making the aspirational a reality”); Michael Kagan, Destructive Ambiguity: Enemy
Nationals and the Legal Enabling of Ethnic Conflict in the Middle East, 38 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 263, 318 (2007) (“Treaty-based humanitarian and human rights law has
always been and probably always will be aspirational.”).
342 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?,
74 IND. L.J. 1397, 1409–11 (1999) (discussing role of “law-declaring fora,” including international courts, in norm-shifting processes).
343 See supra note 44.
344 SHELTON, supra note 16, at 389–90, 399.
345 E.g., id. at 399; Rohrt-Arriaza, supra note 46, at 181 (underscoring limits of individual reparation schemes and endorsing focus on collective nature of remedy); Drazen
Petrovic, Book Review, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1008, 1009–10 (2005) (discussing scholars who
argue that full remedy may be neither beneficial nor possible).
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who bring claims. Rather, other competing interests make it undesirable—for instance, paying out such claims would undermine the
state’s ability to provide services to other, innocent citizens. So a
compromise approach is the best option. But if compromise is permissible in remedying the gravest human rights abuses, it is hard to
see why it would not be permissible in smaller-scale cases.
In addition, international courts could find support for an
interest-balancing approach in the tradition of equity, which has often
been treated as a source of international law.346 The case law of the
ICJ has increasingly incorporated certain equitable principles,347 and
arbitral tribunals have long done so.348 One influential early argument for equity as a formal source of international law came from
Judge Hudson’s separate opinion in the River Meuse case, in which he
argued for application of the “clean hands” principle.349 Judge
Hudson wrote that “principles of equity have long been considered to
constitute a part of international law” and, specifically, qualify as
“general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”—a source
of law under the ICJ Statute.350 While stating that the Chorzów Factory rule is “sound” as a “general principle,” he argued that courts
devising remedies in particular cases “cannot ignore special circumstances which may call for the consideration of equitable
principles.”351
Equity has played a significant role in various aspects of the ICJ’s
jurisprudence in the delimitation of maritime boundaries.352 The
ICJ’s formal basis for relying on equity remains a bit unclear, as
346 WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
197–98 (1964).
347 See Prosper Weil, L’Équité dans la jurisprudence de la Cour Internationale de Justice
[Equity in the Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice], in FIFTY YEARS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 219, at 121–22 (noting that ICJ made frequent reference to concept of equity).
348 See CHRISTOPHER R. ROSSI, EQUITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 59 (1993) (“Equity
was a common element in early general arbitration claims treaties.”).
349 River Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 70, at 76, 78 (June 28)
(Hudson, J., concurring).
350 Id. at 76; see also Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (listing sources of law).
351 River Meuse, 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser A/B) No. 70, at 78 (Hudson, J., concurring); see also
ROSSI, supra note 348, at 155 (discussing impact of Hudson’s opinion).
352 See, e.g., Maritime Delimitation in Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den.
v. Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38, 58–59, 65–67 (June 14); see id. at 258–73 (Weeramantry, J., separate
opinion) (reviewing cases); ROSSI, supra note 348, at 193–213 (discussing Court’s treatment
of criteria for equity and relationship to distributive justice); Robert Y. Jennings, The Principles Governing Marine Boundaries, in STAAT UND VÖLKERRECHTSORDNUNG 397, 400–01
(Kay Hailbronner et al. eds., 1989) (discussing ICJ’s reliance on equitable principles in sea
boundary cases).
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Article 38 of its Statute, which lists the sources of its law, makes no
mention of equity.353 Occasionally, specific treaties that the Court
applies invoke equity,354 but otherwise the Court sometimes suggests
that equitable principles have customary international law status,
sometimes treats them as general principles of law, and sometimes
articulates no clear basis for them.355 Some scholars have suggested
that equity is a “subsidiary” source of law that should guide the application of formal sources.356 This approach also finds some support in
the ICJ’s case law. The Court has referred to equity as a “method of
interpretation of the law”357 and has suggested that where multiple
possible legal principles could govern a given situation, the “requirements of justice” should guide the choice between them.358 In a
famous dictum in the Barcelona Traction case, the Court asserted that
“in the field of . . . international law, it is necessary that the law be
applied reasonably,” guided by “considerations of equity.”359
Equitable principles have specifically influenced the international
law of remedies, as the River Meuse passage above suggests.360 For
instance, the International Law Commission’s Articles on State
Responsibility allow some degree of interest balancing.361 To avoid
“disproportionate” remedies that risk “crippling” the violating state,
the Articles impose a proportionality requirement with respect to cer-

353

ICJ Statute, supra note 350, art. 38.
See, e.g., Jan Mayen, 1993 I.C.J. at 234 (Weeramantry, J., separate opinion) (discussing express inclusion of equity in Law of the Sea Convention).
355 See Weil, supra note 347, at 126 (describing differences as semantic).
356 Id. at 125.
357 Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 567–68 (Dec. 22).
358 Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 60 (Feb. 24); see Weil, supra note
347, at 125 (arguing that equity should guide choice of various means of interpreting or
applying legal norm).
359 Barcelona Traction (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 48 (Feb. 5). Some judges and
scholars have criticized the Court’s application of equitable principles as excessively ad
hoc. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Belg. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 166
(Feb. 20) (Koretsky, V.P., dissenting) (arguing that ICJ’s definition of equity provides too
much discretion); id. at 196 (Tanaka, J., dissenting) (arguing that ICJ’s use of equity is
“unable to furnish any concrete criteria for delimitation”); Mohammed Bedjaoui,
L’Énigme des ‘principes équitables’ dans le droit des délimitations maritimes [The Enigma
of “Equitable Principles” in the Law of Maritime Boundaries], 42 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 367, 376 (1990) (providing overview of scholarly criticism of
ICJ’s use of equity). Others have argued that this flexibility is an asset, especially in “particular circumstances in which the strict rule of law would work an injustice.” Robert Y.
Jennings, Equity and Equitable Principles, 42 ANNUAIRE SUISSE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 27, 32 (1986).
360 See supra notes 349–51 and accompanying text.
361 ILC Articles, supra note 11, arts. 35–37.
354
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tain remedies, in particular restitution and satisfaction.362 Still, equitable principles have hardly displaced the Articles’ rights-maximizing
approach. Instead, they have merely affected the choice among full
remedies—the Articles require full compensation wherever the
claimant is not made whole via restitution.363 And as a general
matter, equity is a rather amorphous concept, and thus a court’s reference to it cannot be read to endorse every aspect of traditional equitable decisionmaking. While interest balancing is traditionally an
aspect of equitable analysis of remedies, equity is not necessarily
synonymous with a form of interest balancing that permits avoidable
remedial shortfall.364
International courts applying human rights law (as opposed to the
law of state responsibility) do not yet appear to have engaged in such
interest balancing, at least outside the mass-claims context.365 Equity
in human rights cases has been invoked principally by the InterAmerican Court to support broad remedies that go beyond full reparation;366 it has not been invoked to support remedial shortfall. Many
scholars, judges, and human rights advocates might understandably be
uncomfortable with the suggestion that the individual right to an
effective remedy should be subject to balancing, rather than full vindication, in all cases. The principle of “no right without a remedy” has a
powerful appeal, and remedial shortfall should not be permitted
without good cause. But those who would prefer to allow no shortfall
must confront the fact that international courts routinely circumvent
both the principle and their own remedial doctrines when confronted
with overly costly remedies. Sometimes, insisting on the most effective remedy means victims get no remedy at all.
CONCLUSION
The experience of the ICTY and ICTR shows that strong remedial rules in human rights law sometimes have perverse consequences.
362 The remedy is proportional to the benefit gained by the injured state and the burden
on the violating state. COMMENTARIES, supra note 13, at 212; see also Shelton, supra note
6, at 851 (describing this as incorporation of equitable principles).
363 ILC Articles, supra note 11, art. 36.
364 See Gewirtz, supra note 3, at 603 (“Equity evolved in part to ameliorate the rigidities
of courts at law that interfered with fully adequate remedial vindication.”).
365 See supra Part I.A (describing human rights courts’ adherence to full remedy rule);
supra note 344 and accompanying text. But see Nikolova Dissent, supra note 218 (arguing
that, instead of Golder approach providing only declaratory relief, European Court should
engage in “careful balancing exercise when assessing the quantum of compensation”).
366 See, e.g., Hilaire, Constantine, and Benjamin et al. Case, 2002 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 94, at 66 (June 21, 2002) (invoking equity to justify bar on execution in addition to new trial even if new trial resulted in reconviction).
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Where compliance poses untenable costs, international courts will circumvent the rule by interpreting rights narrowly, raising prejudice
thresholds, or using procedural mechanisms to avoid hearing rights
claims. To some degree, such dynamics are inevitable and legitimate:
Courts cannot decide rights claims as though they are pure abstractions. But where remedial costs are essentially prohibitive, remedial
deterrence effects can so distort courts’ decisionmaking as to make it
impossible for them to recognize valid claims of rights violations. This
dynamic can snowball as the doctrines developed in high-remedialcost situations spill over to other cases.
This picture should raise serious concerns about the fairness of
international criminal proceedings. Its implications, however, are
potentially much broader. All courts, international and domestic, face
remedial costs that may affect their doctrines. Of course, my specific
conclusions about the ICTs cannot simply be transposed—generalizations are no substitute for in-depth analysis of each specific court’s
institutional characteristics and doctrinal strategies for responding to
remedial costs. That analysis has so far been lacking and is a fertile
ground for future research.
At the ICTs, and perhaps at other international courts, the perverse consequences described here could be mitigated. First, the
courts’ structures and procedures should be designed to minimize
remedial cost pressures, both by diversifying the available remedies
and by adjusting other rules so that rights claims can be decided in a
procedural posture posing lower remedial costs. Second, international
courts’ absolutist approach to the right to an effective remedy should
be replaced with a more flexible interest-balancing approach. This
approach should give heavy weight to victims’ interests but permit
remedial shortfall if the countervailing considerations are strong
enough.
This Article has explored the normative consequences of remedial deterrence only from the perspective of the international courts
(and their creators) themselves, focusing on the courts’ institutional
design and remedial doctrine. But remedial deterrence in international courts may also have significant implications for other actors.
International judicial doctrine is increasingly treated as an important
source of international law. Domestic courts, other international
courts, and political actors often rely on it when interpreting their own
international legal responsibilities. This reliance further magnifies
remedial deterrence effects—doctrinal distortions, although driven by
remedial costs that are largely institution-specific or even casespecific, can spill over beyond an international court’s own docket.
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Accordingly, perhaps remedial deterrence effects should affect
the persuasive weight that national authorities and other actors give to
international judicial doctrine. One possibility is that some remedial
deterrence situations should be understood as cases of “judicial underenforcement” of human rights. Under such a theory, other actors’
international legal obligations could exceed those that international
courts are willing to enforce. The practical import of this understanding would be that when considering the human rights case law
produced by courts facing extreme remedial deterrence pressures
(like the ICTs), other actors should proceed cautiously. They should
treat the ICTs’ criminal procedure rules at most as baselines that do
not necessarily exhaust their own international legal obligations.367
More generally, human rights scholars as well as courts need to
develop a more sophisticated framework for understanding the interrelationships—as well as the gaps—between rights and remedies.
International remedies scholarship has consistently called for
increased remedial powers for international courts, and it has essentially taken for granted the legal impermissibility of remedial shortfall.
That tendency is understandable, given that human rights law is
plagued by weak enforcement. But it may be misguided—as this
Article has demonstrated, stronger remedies can mean weaker rights.

367 The concept of judicial underenforcement of rights is the subject of a significant body
of U.S. constitutional scholarship. The seminal piece was Lawrence G. Sager’s Fair Measure: The Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978),
arguing that the Supreme Court may “underenforce” constitutional norms which still
remain valid and fully enforceable by Congress. See also, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Judicially
Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1276 (2006)
(linking underenforcement of constitutional provisions with search for “judicially manageable standards”); Levinson, supra note 1, at 923–25 (arguing that all rights are underenforced because they are shaped by judicial competence to provide remedy); Kermit
Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does,
91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1652–55 (2005) (arguing that doctrinal rules that underenforce constitutional propositions become mistaken for propositions themselves). Human rights
scholars have not yet explored its application to international courts or to the longstanding
theoretical debates about the sources of international law. Although these questions
exceed the scope of this Article, I hope to begin to fill this gap in my next project, examining the dependency of international courts’ doctrinal rules on institutional constraints
and the consequences of that dependency for the precedential status of those rules.

